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**GREENLIGHTING ADMINISTRATIVE PROSECUTION**

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**Abstract**

 “Greenlighting” is the process whereby the heads of a combined-function federal regulatory agency determine whether to accept the staff’s decision to charge or not charge a target with a violation of law. The charging decision is often the most consequential decision point in a regulatory prosecution and typically sets off a settlement negotiation. Yet the charging decision is unchecked by legislative, execution or judicial mechanisms. Greenlighting is an important accountability tool with respect to the staff’s prosecutorial discretion. It is often used to correct misalignment between the priorities of the agency heads and their staff. Yet greenlighting is controversial because of concern about confirmation bias; having approved a prosecution, the agency heads may be unable to render an unbiased decision when the case returns to them for the final adjudicatory decision.

**I. INTRODUCTION**

 This article concerns the charging practices of federal regulatory agencies that engage both in law enforcement and adjudication (often referred to “combined function” agencies). It focuses on the process by which the staff decides to charge suspected violators (“targets”[[1]](#footnote-1)) and the approval by the agency heads[[2]](#footnote-2) of this charging decision—a process I call “greenlighting.”[[3]](#footnote-3) Thus the focus of the article is on the interaction between staff and agency heads when the agency decides to charge.[[4]](#footnote-4)

 The decision to charge is an exercise of prosecutorial discretion by the staff that resembles the charging decision by prosecutors in criminal cases.[[5]](#footnote-5) In both the criminal and administrative justice systems, the charging decision is likely to be the most consequential decision point.[[6]](#footnote-6) The vast majority of targets settle enforcement cases after the staff decides to recommend enforcement.[[7]](#footnote-7) A settlement usually requires the target to accede to various unwelcome remedies. For those who settle after being charged, the charging decision is the only agency decision that matters. The charging decision will probably be announced to the public through a press release which insures adverse publicity. And, of course, an agency’s refusal to charge is equally consequential, since it may signal under-enforcement of regulatory norms or industry capture of the agency’s enforcement mechanism.

 A target may decide not to settle and to contest the charges through the adjudicatory process of hearing before an administrative law judge (ALJ) and appeal of the ALJ decision to the agency heads. The decision to litigate rather than settle carries with it the certainty of heavy attorneys’ fees and other litigation costs, as well as a significant drain on executives’ time. And, of course, there is a better-than-even probability that the target will lose, perhaps becoming subject to more onerous remedies than it might have settled for. Thus, the charging decision is a critical landmark in an administrative enforcement case, whether it is settled or litigated. Administrative charging decisions and prosecutorial discretion are worthy subjects for inquiry, but they have been understudied.[[8]](#footnote-8)

 Part II of this article describes the charging and greenlighting practices of five combined-function federal agencies. Part III discusses the costs and benefits of greenlighting. Part IV discusses the legality of greenlighting under due process and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). Part V discusses additional checking mechanisms and suggests best practices for the greenlighting function. Part VI concludes.

**II. THE ENFORCEMENT PROCESS IN FIVE COMBINED-FUNCTION AGENCIES**

 Interviews by the author provide the primary source of data for this article. The interviews focused on the charging practices of five important federal combined-function agencies—SEC, FTC, FERC, FCC, and NLRB. I conducted interviews with former agency heads and former agency staff members, as well as law professors and private defense lawyers, many of whom were former agency heads or staff. I am most grateful to these interviewees for serving as data sources and I have promised them anonymity. As a result, citations to interviews will identify the agency concerned and the interviewee by number but will not disclose names or identifying details.

**A. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION (SEC)**

 The SEC can impose significant monetary sanctions on persons who violate the securities laws.[[9]](#footnote-9) The SEC litigates the majority of enforcement cases through in-house administrative litigation rather than by seeking relief in federal courts, since the available monetary remedies are the same in either venue.[[10]](#footnote-10) A recent case decided by the Fifth Circuit invalidates SEC in-house adjudication of civil money penalty cases. *Jarkesy v. SEC*[[11]](#footnote-11)holds that in-house SEC enforcement of civil penalties violates the target’s right to jury trial; that the agency’s ability to choose between in-house enforcement and federal court enforcement is an invalid delegation of legislative power; and that SEC ALJs are unconstitutionally protected from removal without cause. The *Jarkesy* decision will prevent the SEC from imposing civil money penalties through the use of in-house adjudication; some of its reasoning threatens all federal agency in-house enforcement litigation. The article proceeds as though *Jarkesy* will not be followed in other circuits and will eventually be overturned by the Supreme Court.

 The enforcement process begins with investigation of a target by the Enforcement Division (ED). The investigators can initiate investigations and issue subpoenas without agency-head approval.[[12]](#footnote-12) After ED makes a preliminary determination that the facts justify a charging decision, it generates a detailed “Wells notice” that summarizes its conclusions and recommendations. The target can then file a detailed “Wells submission” in response to the Wells notice.[[13]](#footnote-13)

 The Dodd-Frank Act requires the Commission to issue a complaint within 180 days of issuing a Wells notice.[[14]](#footnote-14) As a result, the staff now frequently dispenses with the Wells procedure. Another reason the staff might not utilize the Wells notice is that public companies believe they must disclose issuance of a Wells notice and therefore prefer to avoid it. If the Wells notice is omitted, the staff communicates its intention to recommend issuance of a complaint via an informal memo or phone call and the target can respond with a “white paper.”[[15]](#footnote-15) Under either procedure, targets may request access to the Commission’s investigative file and staff has discretion to disclose information that will assist the target to defend the case.[[16]](#footnote-16) Staff members vary in their willingness to disclose material in investigative files.[[17]](#footnote-17)

 If the staff is not persuaded by the Wells submission or the white paper, it generates an “action memorandum” to the commissioners recommending that the Commission charge the target. The action memorandum is circulated to all operating divisions of the Commission as well as to the General Counsel. It contains a comprehensive explanation of the factual and legal foundation of the recommendation and analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of the case. The memorandum summarizes and responds to arguments submitted by respondents in the Wells submission or the white paper. It also responds to input received from other Commission offices or from the General Counsel.

 The action memorandum recommends either the issuance of a complaint for in-house administrative enforcement (“action instituting proceedings”) or that the SEC should seek enforcement action in federal court or make a criminal referral to the Department of Justice. If the target and the staff have agreed to a settlement, the action memo contains the proposed settlement. The vast majority of cases settle at some point before hearing.[[18]](#footnote-18) Staff may conduct meetings with commissioners to discuss particular charging recommendations.[[19]](#footnote-19)

 When the chair determines that the charging decision or settlement is ready for full consideration, the five commissioners consider and vote on the matter at a closed meeting.[[20]](#footnote-20) The General Counsel and heads of the relevant SEC divisions are present at this meeting. The commissioners have access to the Wells notice and the Wells submission (or the white paper). Occasionally the matter will be put over until a later meeting or resolved by seriatim emails. In emergency situations, the “duty officer” (a single commissioner) has power to authorize enforcement action; the other commissions will ratify that action at a later time.[[21]](#footnote-21) The Commission approves the vast majority of the charging recommendations in action memoranda, although there is occasionally vigorous discussion of the charging decision and split decisions.[[22]](#footnote-22)

The SEC has a moderate adjudicatory caseload. In the six-month period ending March 2022, there were 210 adjudicatory matters (including Actions Instituting Proceedings) before the SEC, 9 cases pending before ALJs (during this period, ALJs rendered 6 initial decisions and disposed of 4 cases through settlement or dismissal), and 12 ALJ cases pending at the Commission level.[[23]](#footnote-23)

**B. FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION (FTC)**

The FTC’s Competition and Consumer Protection bureaus investigate potential enforcement cases without seeking authorization from the full Commission.[[24]](#footnote-24) The staff ordinarily contacts proposed targets to advise them of the general nature of the inquiry. Targets typically meet informally with the staff and the head of the relevant bureau during the investigation and are entitled to submit memoranda (called “white papers”) on key issues.[[25]](#footnote-25)

 The staff of the relevant Bureau then prepares a “memorandum recommending complaint” which analyzes the factual basis for the recommendation and explains why issuance of a complaint would be in the public interest.[[26]](#footnote-26) If there is a settlement (and the vast majority of cases settle 51 F.4th 644

[[27]](#footnote-27)), the memorandum includes the proposed consent decree. In unsettled cases, the commissioners receive the white paper together with additional memoranda from the general counsel and from staff and chiefs of the Bureau of Competition and the Bureau of Economics.[[28]](#footnote-28) The memorandum recommending complaint indicates whether the FTC should seek relief in federal court. For example, in merger cases the FTC often seeks an injunction pending the administrative process.

 After staff submits the memorandum, respondents have an opportunity to meet individually with the commissioners to persuade them that no complaint should be issued or that the case should be settled. Staff members are usually present at these meetings.[[29]](#footnote-29)

 In order to greenlight a complaint, the FTC must determine that there is “reason to believe” that a violation has occurred and that a proceeding would be in the “public interest.”[[30]](#footnote-30) A “moving commissioner” is assigned randomly to each case and the moving commissioner decides when the charging decision is ready for full Commission consideration. However, a majority of the Commission can bring a matter up for decision despite opposition of the moving commissioner.[[31]](#footnote-31)

The Commission discusses the charging decision in a closed meeting or makes the decision through seriatim communications. The commissioners generally respect and follow the views of the chair about enforcement priorities, particularly since the chair is in contact with staff during the investigatory process and usually concurs in the staff memoranda.[[32]](#footnote-32) The same process is used for the approval of settlements negotiated by staff. There is an elaborate procedure for public comment on proposed settlements in competition cases.[[33]](#footnote-33)

In 2020, the Commission resolved 36 competition cases (12 merger consent orders, 9 merger cases filed, 11 mergers abandoned, 3 non-merger cases, 1 civil penalty). In the consumer protection area, the FTC filed 21 administrative cases and 66 federal court cases.[[34]](#footnote-34)

**C. FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION (FCC)**

 The FCC’s Enforcement Bureau (EB) investigates a broad range of complaints against licensees, manufacturers of telecommunications equipment, robo-callers, and others.[[35]](#footnote-35) The FCC has no formalized process to provide notice to targets and allow them to comment during the investigation process. If the staff concludes that a target should be charged, it prepares a detailed Notice of Apparent Liability (NAL). The NAL can seek a civil money penalty (called a “forfeiture” in FCC parlance) or a licensee sanction (such as revocation).

 The staff has delegated authority to issue an NAL for a civil penalty that does not exceed $100,000 for common carriers and $25,000 for other entities. NALs that propose greater amounts must be greenlighted by the full Commission.[[36]](#footnote-36) The charging decision in cases involving licensee discipline other than civil penalties must also be approved by the full Commission. Commission approval is not required for settlements negotiated by staff. The Enforcement Bureau might consider about 450 cases a year and issue about 200-300 NALs, most of which are settled. The Commission might exercise its greenlighting function in perhaps 20 to 40 enforcement cases per year.[[37]](#footnote-37)

 The Chair has substantial authority over whether the staff will issue an NAL in a specific case and when an NAL will be presented to the Commission. The EB does not produce an additional confidential document about the case for the commissioners to consider, but it may conduct ex parte conversations with commissioners or their advisory staffs.[[38]](#footnote-38) Normally, the Commission votes whether to approve the NAL and declare a forfeiture through a system of notational voting, rather than an in-person meeting. The Commission usually greenlights the NAL, although there have been instances where it refused to do so, often resulting from shifts in the membership of the Commission. There are occasional dissents to decisions issuing forfeitures.

 If the EB issues an NAL under delegated authority or if the Commission greenlights the NAL, the target can file a detailed response to the NAL. After issuance of an NAL, targets have the opportunity to meet with FCC commissioners separately in meetings attended by enforcement staff.[[39]](#footnote-39) If the FCC members are not persuaded by the target’s response to the NAL, they issue a notice of forfeiture.[[40]](#footnote-40)

 The FCC does not usually adjudicate civil penalty cases through ALJ hearings (although it has the option to do so). ALJ hearings are provided in licensee discipline cases that seek remedies such as license revocation rather than civil penalties.[[41]](#footnote-41) The agency heads normally decide civil penalty cases through consideration of documents in the file (NAL and response) rather than by trial-type hearings. The FCC does not regard this process as “adjudicatory,” so the rules relating to internal separation of functions do not apply. Enforcement staff can and do speak off the record with the commissioners or their advisers at all points in the process. Separation of functions rules do apply, however, to cases sent to an ALJ.

 The FCC does not consider civil penalty determinations as adjudicatory because the agency lacks power to collect civil penalties. The Department of Justice must enforce the penalty in federal district court which provides a de novo hearing. I was told that it is difficult to get the DOJ interested if the proposed penalty is less than a substantial amount, perhaps $75,000, depending on the district and how busy the U.S. attorneys are.[[42]](#footnote-42) Obviously, the FCC’s inability to enforce the civil penalty through internal adjudication, rather than through federal court litigation controlled by DOJ, detracts from the effectiveness of civil penalties as a regulatory tool. The vast majority of FCC enforcement cases (perhaps 80%) are settled through consent decrees negotiated by the staff before or after the NAL is issued.[[43]](#footnote-43)

**D. FEDERAL ENERGY REGULATORY COMMISSION (FERC)[[44]](#footnote-44)**

 FERC has power to levy substantial civil penalties (up to $1.3 million per violation per day) and can order other remedial sanctions. Its investigative and prosecutorial arm is the Office of Enforcement (OE). OE dismisses the majority of the cases it investigates as lacking merit and often exercises prosecutorial discretion in declining to pursue borderline cases. Although law enforcement is a relatively small part of FERC’s responsibilities, enforcement cases often require application of unsettled law about manipulation of energy markets.[[45]](#footnote-45) Thus, enforcement cases are often used vehicles for making policy.[[46]](#footnote-46)

 During the investigation process, OE staff and counsel for targets are in regular contact.[[47]](#footnote-47) FERC allows targets to communicate in writing with Commissioners during the investigative stage and some targets take advantage of this opportunity.[[48]](#footnote-48) If the staff seeks formal investigative authority to issue a subpoena for documents or take a deposition, it must receive authority from the Commission, but this is rarely necessary as targets typically agree to informal investigative discovery.[[49]](#footnote-49)

 If OE determines that a violation occurred that warrants imposition of sanctions, it provides the target with a “preliminary findings letter” that furnishes a detailed description of the staff’s findings of fact and its legal theories. The letter may be in the form of a slide deck.[[50]](#footnote-50) The target has an opportunity to submit a brief that responds to the staff’s preliminary findings.[[51]](#footnote-51) Attorneys who represent targets subject to enforcement issues believe that the preliminary statement and the opportunity to respond are quite useful to their clients.[[52]](#footnote-52)

 If OE continues to believe a sanction is warranted, it seeks approval for settlement authority from the agency heads. This practice seems unique to FERC. The submission includes the target’s response to the preliminary findings letter.[[53]](#footnote-53) If the Commission approves, staff then pursues settlement negotiations within the parameters set by the Commission. If a settlement is reached, OE seeks agency head approval of the settlement. At least 90% of cases settle at some point in the process.[[54]](#footnote-54) Interviewees had conflicting opinions about whether the process of granting settlement authority to the staff was worth its costs and delays.[[55]](#footnote-55)

 If the parties fail to negotiate a settlement and OE wishes to proceed with an enforcement action, OE provides the subject with notice (referred to as a Rule 1b.19 statement) and a further opportunity to respond within 30 days.[[56]](#footnote-56) The Rule 1b.19 procedure was modeled after the SEC’s Wells notice.[[57]](#footnote-57) Rule 1b.19 statements tend to be briefer than the earlier preliminary findings letter. The target has the right to respond to the 1b.19 notice, but the staff is not required to answer the target’s response.[[58]](#footnote-58) Some interviewees believe that it is redundant to give the target two notices and the opportunity to write two briefs, since by this point, it is unlikely OE will change its views.[[59]](#footnote-59) Others think it is not redundant because investigations often take years to complete during which time new commissioners are appointed.[[60]](#footnote-60)

 If OE is not persuaded by the target’s Rule 1b.19 response, it drafts an “Enforcement Staff Report and Recommendation” to the agency heads. This memo includes OE’s proposed findings and conclusions and its recommendation that the agency issue an order finding violations and assessing civil penalties. The enforcement staff and the Commission’s advisory staff and the commissioners themselves often negotiate about the content of the report. The charging recommendation is usually approved through notational voting rather than at a formal meeting. It is rare that the agency heads fail to approve the recommendation (since the extensive contacts between staff and agency heads make it likely that the heads concur), but instances of non-approval or dissenting opinions have occurred.[[61]](#footnote-61)

 If the heads concur with OE’s recommendation, FERC issues an Order to Show Cause (OSC), which is the charging document. The target has still another opportunity to respond to the OSC through a formal brief.[[62]](#footnote-62) The Commission’s issuance of an OSC triggers the Commission’s ex parte and separation of functions rules. At that point, the enforcement staff is prohibited from communicating with the heads or their decisional advisers except on the record.[[63]](#footnote-63)

The applicable procedure from this point forward depends on whether the case involves electricity or gas. In gas cases, the heads refer the case to an ALJ for a trial-type hearing if there are unresolved factual issues. In gas cases heard by an ALJ, the agency heads make the final agency decision.

 In electricity but not gas cases, a target can elect a different process within 30 days after FERC issues an OSC proposing a civil penalty.[[64]](#footnote-64) Alternative process allows the target to obtain a “review de novo” of the assessment before a federal district court. If the target makes this election, the Commission assesses the penalty after a “paper hearing” (meaning the decision is based on documents in the file). FERC then files an action in district court for an order affirming the civil penalty. The court conducts a trial of the validity of the sanction. In close to 100% of electricity cases, lawyers make this election because they feel the prospects for success are better before a district court than if the FERC decides the case in house.[[65]](#footnote-65) In district courts, the Commission has been successful in obtaining favorable pre-trial rulings in support of its enforcement theories, though most cases settle before trial.[[66]](#footnote-66)

**E. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD (NLRB)**

 The General Counsel (GC) of the NLRB has exclusive power to decide whether to issue complaints based on charges filed in unfair labor practice (ULP) cases. As a result, the five NLRB board members play no role in those decisions and exercise no prosecutorial function.[[67]](#footnote-67) The GC is appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate. Whether the President can discharge the GC is currently the subject of federal court litigation.[[68]](#footnote-68)

 In one important respect, Board members exercise a prosecutorial function. Board members must greenlight the GC’s recommendation to engage in litigation to seek a temporary injunction in a ULP case (so called “10(j) cases”).[[69]](#footnote-69) The Board seeks temporary injunctions in cases of irreparable injury or where delay would impede the efficacy of the Board’s ultimate remedies.[[70]](#footnote-70) The Board members make greenlighting decisions in 10(j) cases by notational voting rather than in meetings. The Board usually approves the GC’s recommendation to seek an injunction, but there are occasional denials, modifications of the proposed petitions, and dissents.[[71]](#footnote-71) Board members also have power to review recommendations made by regional directors in representation cases, such as determination of appropriate bargaining units, but such cases re not considered prosecutorial.

 In addition to control over charging decisions, the GC manages the agency’s staff as well as its litigation function. Federal court litigation is extensive because the Board must enforce its orders in court, seek injunctions, enforce subpoenas and engage in numerous other litigation matters.

 The NLRB prosecutorial process begins when an outside party (either an employer, a union or an individual ) files a ULP “charge” with a regional office (RO). The RO affords the charged party an opportunity to file a position statement setting forth its version of the case. NLRB regional directors make the initial charging decisions.

 During the investigation process, the charged party has informal opportunities to influence the charging decision through meetings with RO investigators.[[72]](#footnote-72) If the regional director declines to issue a complaint, the charging party can appeal to the Office of Appeals, which is a review section of the GC’s office.[[73]](#footnote-73) In cases involving unsettled legal issues, the regional director may seek advice from the GC’s Division of Advice. During the advice-giving process, the target has an opportunity to file a brief and argue its position.

 During FY 2021, the Board received 15,081 ULP charges. About one-third were found to have merit.[[74]](#footnote-74) Regional offices issued 678 complaints. The Board sought 10(j) temporary injunctions in nine cases. The Board issued 136 decisions in contested ULP cases. These figures were depressed by the COVID pandemic. The figures from earlier years are considerably higher.[[75]](#footnote-75) Well over 90% of the NLRB’s cases settle after issuance of a complaint.[[76]](#footnote-76) NLRB ALJs are particularly active in promoting settlements; often a different ALJ is assigned to the case to mediate it.[[77]](#footnote-77)

**III. THE MERITS OF GREENLIGHTING**

 As discussed in Part I, the enforcement process in combined-function agencies begins with an investigation conducted by agency staff members who suspect a private sector target with wrongdoing.[[78]](#footnote-78) If the investigators conclude that the law and facts support the issuance of a complaint, they report their conclusion to agency prosecutors. In the agencies I studied, other than the NLRB, the prosecutors lack power to issue complaints on their own. Instead, they must request the agency heads to greenlight the case by authorizing the issuance of a complaint, initiating federal court action, or making a criminal referral to the Department of Justice. In the vast majority of cases, the staff and the target have agreed to a settlement before the greenlighting stage, but agency heads must approve the settlement.

 Part III discusses the greenlighting function. It situates greenlighting as an accountability mechanism and as “internal administrative law” (Part A). It then discusses the arguments for and against the practice (Parts B and C). It concludes that the benefits of greenlighting outweigh the costs (Part D).

**A. INTERNAL ADMINISTRATIVE LAW**

 This article discusses charging decisions by federal combined-function administrative agencies and the mechanisms by which prosecutorial discretion in such agencies is checked. As a practical matter, there are no external judicial, legislative or executive branch accountability mechanisms[[79]](#footnote-79) that constrain agency enforcement discretion.[[80]](#footnote-80) Unlike most state and local criminal prosecutors, agency prosecutors and agency heads are not subject to check through periodic elections or recall elections.

 The judiciary cannot review charging decisions because they are not “final orders.”[[81]](#footnote-81) Moreover, charging decisions are normally unreviewable because they are committed to agency discretion.[[82]](#footnote-82) In any case, the vast majority of administrative enforcement cases settle instead of being adjudicated to a final agency decision, leaving nothing for courts to review. Of cases litigated to a final decision by the agency heads, relatively few are judicially reviewed since the review process is so slow and costly and various deference doctrines make reversal unlikely.[[83]](#footnote-83) If the case is judicially reviewed, the court considers the merits of the decision, not the preliminary decision to charge. Even a successful judicial assault on an agency enforcement decision often produces only a remand that allows the agency to reconsider the case and come to the same conclusion. Nor does Congress or the President exert any meaningful control over enforcement discretion in individual cases; indeed, it would be improper for those bodies to interfere in a pending adjudicatory process.[[84]](#footnote-84)

 The charging process is largely concealed from the public and from targets. An agency can close the meeting at which it considers whether to take enforcement action[[85]](#footnote-85) (in fact at most agencies these decisions are made by notational voting, not in meetings). Staff memoranda recommending enforcement are exempt from FOIA disclosure.[[86]](#footnote-86)

 Because no external checking mechanisms exist, agencies should generate internal checks on the prosecutorial process.[[87]](#footnote-87) Such checking practices are referred to as “internal administrative law,”[[88]](#footnote-88) meaning procedures created by the agency itself that the agency is not legally required to provide. Such procedures might limit the discretion of agency heads or staff, allow monitoring by superiors of staff discretionary decisions, or provide protections for regulated parties and regulatory beneficiaries.

**B. THE CASE FOR GREENLIGHTING**

 The greenlighting function has important structural advantages as an accountability mechanism.[[89]](#footnote-89) For a number of reasons, the agency heads rather than the staff should make the call when the agency’s enforcement caseload is small enough to allow them to do so.[[90]](#footnote-90)

 As pointed out earlier, from the point of view of the target of administrative enforcement, the charging decision is often the most important procedural event in the entire regulatory process.[[91]](#footnote-91) If the heads believe a case brought to them by prosecutors is weak or ill-advised, or does not align with agency head priorities, the case should be stopped before it goes any further. In such cases, the target should not be forced to agree to a settlement and the agency should not embark on the costly adjudication process.

 However, the argument for greenlighting goes well beyond the protection of private interests. An agency must adopt prosecutorial priorities, since its resources will never be adequate to prosecute every case that might involve a regulatory violation.[[92]](#footnote-92) It is appropriate for agency heads rather than staff to make the call on the allocation of limited enforcement resources. Even more significant, combined-function agencies use adjudication for policymaking, and the choice of which cases to prosecute is an essential element of the policymaking process. The balance of this section explores the arguments in favor of greenlighting in greater detail.

 1. Principles of public administration[[93]](#footnote-93)

 Accepted principles of public administration suggest that agency heads must supervise staff decisionmakers in hierarchical government organizations agencies that exercise delegated power.[[94]](#footnote-94) Supervision is essential to ensure that the priorities of agency heads are implemented and that the norms and practices of the agency have been respected. Agency head supervision is particularly vital when it concerns functions like charging decisions that are unconstrained by external judicial, executive, legislative, or political checks.[[95]](#footnote-95) Of course, supervision can take many forms, but greenlighting is one effective method of accomplishing it.

 The agency head approval process serves other goals identified by public administration scholars. William Simon identifies a set of practices described as “post-bureaucratic organization.”[[96]](#footnote-96) These practices depart from the traditional choice between professionalism (that allows professionals such as prosecutors to exercise unconstrained discretion) and strict hierarchical bureaucratic control. Post-bureaucratic administration entails transparency and a requirement of justification for staff discretionary decisions, representation of stakeholders, and multi-disciplinary group decision-making for evaluating discretionary decisions.

 Simon observes that the post-bureaucratic administrative innovation has had little impact on the criminal prosecution process. However, greenlighting exemplifies post-bureaucratic administration. It requires professional prosecutors to explain and justify their charging decisions and makes these decisions transparent to agency heads. The notice and comment process that precedes greenlighting exposes prosecutors to the opinions of stakeholders such as targets or victims. Greenlighting entails a multi-disciplinary collegial discussion among the agency heads. Greenlighting encourages agencies to adopt prosecution guidelines. It enables the heads to monitor prosecution decisions and to adjust their priorities when there is a change in the markets the agency regulates or when the priorities of the agency heads change.

 There is another way that greenlighting serves important principles of public administration. As practiced in most agencies, greenlighting requires staff prosecutors to produce a confidential and candid memorandum to the agency heads. These memos explain the factual, legal, and policy rationales for charging a target or settling the dispute. They analyze strategic concerns such as evidentiary weak points or political implications. SEC prosecutors file “Action Memos;” FTC prosecutors file “Memoranda Recommending Complaint;” FERC prosecutors produce the “Enforcement Staff Report and Recommendation.” The process of preparing such memoranda is likely to improve the staff’s decisionmaking process. Staff members realize that they will have repeated interactions with the agency members and are anxious to preserve their credibility by writing thorough and balanced memoranda.

 Still another advantage of greenlighting is that in multi-member agencies, the greenlighting function compels agency heads to make a collective and collegial deliberative decision about prosecution priorities. Multi-member agency heads must be balanced politically and are likely to have different skill sets and backgrounds. As a result, the collective agency-head decision about enforcement priorities and charging decisions may be better than leaving that decision to prosecutors (as in the criminal law process) or to the general counsel (as in the case of the NLRB). This assumes, of course, that the agency’s caseload permits collective decisions about prosecution (as it probably does not in the case of the NLRB). This pluralistic decisionmaking process is one of the advantages of multi-headed agencies, and that advantage applies to enforcement decisionmaking as well as to other administrative functions like rulemaking or final adjudicatory decisions.[[97]](#footnote-97)

 2. Internal separation of powers

 The greenlighting function is an example of “internal separation of powers” as described by Jon Michaels.[[98]](#footnote-98) Michaels describes three distinct and competitive interests at play in agency decisionmaking. The three are the agency heads, the agency staff, and outsiders to the agency (including both regulated parties and beneficiaries of the regulatory scheme). These three interests engage in constant rivalrous competition in the course of a variety of administrative functions. Michaels points out the parallels between this internal separation of powers and the traditional system of external separation of powers and checks and balances between the legislative, executive, and judicial branches of government.

 Applying Michaels’ analysis to charging decisions, the agency staff investigators and prosecutors take the initiative to uncover violations and prioritize them. They make the initial decision whether to prosecute, settle, or abandon the cases. The staff is checked by the agency heads who must greenlight the staff’s decision. In practice, the heads almost always back the staff, but the need for agency head approval constrains prosecutorial decisions.[[99]](#footnote-99) Regulatory targets also have substantial ability to influence the notice and comment system employed in many agencies and which are discussed in Part IV of this article. Thus, the three interests identified by Michaels engage in a competitive struggle within the adjudicatory process, with the same positive effects as traditional inter-branch checks and balances. Because, as discussed above, external separation of powers has almost no influence over charging decisions,[[100]](#footnote-100) internal separation of powers seems to be an attractive alternative.

 3. The principal-agent problem

 Prosecutorial decisions or settlements can represent a principal-agent problem if the preferences and priorities of staff prosecutors fail to align with those of the agency heads. Misalignment of prosecutorial priorities between agency and staff can produce either over- or under-enforcement.

 Agency prosecutors sometimes want to over-enforce by pushing the envelope to pursue targets they perceive as wrongdoers, even if the evidentiary basis for doing so is questionable or the legal theory is not well supported by existing precedent.[[101]](#footnote-101) The staff may be pursuing a “crackdown” by allocating resources to a particular class of cases that the heads do not support.[[102]](#footnote-102) Prosecutors may be overcharging to force the target to settle. Agency attorneys may have their own future careers in mind rather than the public interest.[[103]](#footnote-103) The staff may wish to use resources unwisely by concentrating on trivial cases that are easier to win or to run up the numbers.[[104]](#footnote-104) Thus the requirement that the agency heads greenlight a charging decision helps to rectify possible misalignment of priorities between staff and agency heads. Such misalignment issues have sometimes surfaced in NLRB unfair labor practice enforcement, where the general counsel rather than the agency heads controls charging decisions.[[105]](#footnote-105) In an interesting recent development, the FTC heads voted (3-2) to sue to block Meta’s acquisition of Within, *rejecting* the staff’s recommendation not to attack the acquisition.[[106]](#footnote-106) This vote reflects misalignment between agency heads and staff that would produce under-enforcement and was rectified by a positive greenlighting determination.

 In addition to correcting misalignment of priorities, greenlighting creates what is sometimes called a “sentinel effect.” The sentinel effect means that people make different decisions when those decisions are subject to check than when they are not. The sentinel effect exists because the staff is well acquainted with the enforcement preferences of the chair and the other agency heads. The heads may have made these preferences clear in discussions with prosecutors, or the prosecutors may discern these preferences from their experience with past greenlighting events. Staff prosecutors might not advance proposed complaints if they think that the agency heads might reject or narrow them, or even that there might be a contentious discussion and a split vote at the commission level. I frequently asked interview subjects a counterfactual question: if greenlighting did not exist and the staff was free to choose prosecution targets, would the pattern of prosecutions look different than it does now? Most interviewees answered affirmatively. They believed that the staff would have been more aggressive in choosing prosecution targets if their charging decisions were not subject to greenlighting.[[107]](#footnote-107)

 Agency head approval obviously is less effective as a check on under-enforcement (as opposed to over-enforcement) since the heads may not see cases on which the staff has passed.[[108]](#footnote-108) In particularly important cases, a staff recommendation *not* to charge may enter the greenlighting process and enable the agency heads to reject the staff’s decision by increasing the level of enforcement, as occurred in the FTC’s decision to sue Meta discussed above. In less important cases, the under-enforcement problem is often addressed by informal communications between the chair and the general counsel.[[109]](#footnote-109)

**B. THE CASE AGAINST AGENCY-HEAD GREENLIGHTING**

 1. Confirmation bias

 a. The confirmation bias problem

 A number of observers of the administrative enforcement process are troubled by the problem of confirmation bias,[[110]](#footnote-110) because the greenlighting process requires agency heads to discharge both prosecutorial and judicial functions in the same case. As a result, the heads may be unable to render an unbiased final adjudicatory decision when a case they greenlighted returns to them for the final agency decision.[[111]](#footnote-111) This concern was identified as early as the famous 1941 *Report of the Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure*, which offered a suggestion to partially remedy the problem.[[112]](#footnote-112)

 Confirmation bias might manifest itself in different ways. For example, the agency heads may be reluctant to overturn an ALJ’s decision against the target because doing so would suggest that the heads were wrong to have greenlighted the complaint in the first place and thus wasted agency resources.[[113]](#footnote-113) And the converse problem exists as well—commissioners who voted against greenlighting the complaint may be reluctant to uphold an ALJ’s decision against the target because to do so would suggest they were wrong to have opposed the decision to charge.[[114]](#footnote-114)

 There is another way that greenlighting could produce a biased adjudicatory decision. Agency heads might rely on ex parte information, opinions, and anecdotes communicated to them by the prosecutorial staff in the meetings that occurred during the greenlighting process. Yet this material might not appear in the record of the hearing conducted by the ALJ. That record should form the exclusive basis on which the heads make the final adjudicatory decision. This problem becomes more severe the greater the number and intensity of the contacts between the staff and agency heads before the charging decision occurs. In FERC, for example, such communications apparently occur frequently over a course of years during the investigatory process.[[115]](#footnote-115)
 The drafters of the APA were concerned by the problem of confirmation bias of staff members that advise decisionmakers, and they instituted a system of internal separation of functions to protect against it. Under section 554(d) of the APA, agency staff members who played a significant adversarial role in a case as prosecutors, investigators or advocates are prohibited from serving as adjudicatory decisionmakers or as off-the-record advisers to the decisionmakers. Congress had two rationales for the requirement of internal separation of functions. First, an adversarial staff member’s prosecutorial or investigative work may have infused a “will to win” that distorts the adversary’s ability to serve as an impartial decisionmaker or adviser. Second, the adversary may have been exposed to information about the facts of the case or other information about the target and its behavior that do not find their way into the adjudicatory record. As discussed above, these are the two ways that greenlighting might also create confirmation bias at the agency head level.[[116]](#footnote-116)

 However, for reasons to be discussed,[[117]](#footnote-117) agency heads are excluded from the APA’s separation of functions requirement. The APA allows the heads to take part in both the prosecutorial and adjudicatory phases of the case, a combination of functions that creates a risk that they may be subject to confirmation bias.

 b. Reasons to believe that confirmation bias is not a serious problem.

 In theory, the risk that agency-head decisionmakers may be affected by confirmation bias should be greatly reduced by the differences in their prosecutorial and adjudicative roles. For example, the burden of proof at the two stages is different. The greenlighting decision is based on probable cause to believe that a violation of law has occurred. An adjudicatory decision against the target must be supported by a preponderance of the evidence in the record—a far more demanding decisional standard.

 There are important differences in the cognitive process employed in carrying out the prosecutorial and adjudicatory tasks. When they greenlight a complaint, the agency members know they are relying on a one-sided ex parte staff presentation of the evidence in favor of charging. Often the staff accepted the credibility of outsider witnesses for purposes of deciding to charge the target. The final decision, on the other hand, occurs after a trial-type adversarial hearing that will test the credibility of witnesses. The ALJ produces a reasoned opinion based on the evidence presented during the hearing. The agency heads are limited by the exclusive record rule to considering only the evidence introduced at the hearing. Whether the differences in the decisionmaking function at the two stages make any practical difference, however, is disputed. In any event, many targets and their attorneys are not impressed by the differences between the prosecutorial and adjudicatory stages. They continue to complain that their prosecutors have turned around to act as their judges.

 The confirmation bias problem arises rather infrequently. Most greenlighted cases settle; very few of them make it all the way to a final decision by the agency heads. And of those cases that traverse the entire process, confirmation bias is seldom a problem because of the high rate of turnover of agency heads. The heads who are called upon to make the final decision are usually not the same people who greenlighted the case years before. But those agency heads who remain in their job for more than a couple of years are likely to see cases a second time.

 c. Interviewees’ views on confirmation bias

 In my interviews, a majority of former agency heads said that they did not believe that they personally were subject to confirmation bias, but they were aware of the issue.[[118]](#footnote-118) Indeed, some said they barely remembered the meetings at which they greenlighted the complaints. They pointed to the differences between the greenlighting and adjudication decisions that are discussed above, such as the exclusive record and differences in burden of proof. They observe that a failure to take account of evidence and argument developed during the ALJ hearing would invite disaster on judicial review.[[119]](#footnote-119) Needless to say, however, such interview data is not very reliable. Nobody likes to admit they might have been biased. Moreover, some former agency heads stated that they found the situation uncomfortable,[[120]](#footnote-120) and others acknowledged that it created an appearance of bias even though they believed they were not personally subject to confirmation bias.[[121]](#footnote-121)

 Some former agency staff members believe that confirmation bias is a serious problem.[[122]](#footnote-122) Other former staff members who are now in the defense bar disagree; they do not see confirmation as a problem with which they are concerned.[[123]](#footnote-123) Again, data from staff interviews is mostly meaningless; there is no way a former staff person could know whether the agency heads were biased in deciding cases that the staff members had been involved in prosecuting.

 d. Empirical research on confirmation bias

 Attempted empirical research on the existence of confirmation bias based on win rates is inconclusive. This is hardly surprising given the elusive character of psychological phenomena such as confirmation bias. Clearly, there are many other variables that predict win rates, most of them more important than confirmation bias.

 Most of the empirical work on this issue concerns the FTC. The most comprehensive study of the issue covered all FTC agency-head administrative decisions between 1977 and 2016 (a total of 145 cases).[[124]](#footnote-124) It suggests that confirmation bias is not a major problem if it exists at all. When the same Commission majority both authorized the complaint and decided the case, the FTC dismissed 33% of the cases. When a different majority voted out the complaint and made the final decision, the FTC dismissed only 27% of the cases.[[125]](#footnote-125)

 Several other studies of FTC decisionmaking point in the opposite direction, but they are based on a shorter time period and consider only limited portions of the FTC’s work. One study of FTC merger decisions between 1950 and 2011 indicated that confirmation bias does exist. When three, four, or five commissioners who made the final decision also participated in the charging decision, the FTC enjoyed a greater win rate than in situations where zero, one, or two commissioners participated in both decisions.[[126]](#footnote-126)

Other studies simply infer bias from the fact that the agency wins most of the cases decided at the Commission level.[[127]](#footnote-127) However this analytical method is suspect given that the FTC is a law-enforcement agency with discretion to select only strong cases to prosecute and where the vast majority of the cases settle. Agency decisionmakers are naturally subject to institutional bias; it is not surprising that they would uphold most or all of the ALJ decisions that come to them, whether or not confirmation bias also exists.[[128]](#footnote-128)

 2. Efficiency

 A second disadvantage of the greenlighting system is based on efficiency concerns. The greenlighting process can be quite time consuming for agency heads, especially if they are conscientious about reading the complete files. Another efficiency concern is that the need for greenlighting at the agency head level can prolong settlement negotiations or increase the time between the prosecutorial decision to charge and the commencement of an agency hearing. Thus, greenlighting may contribute to the problem of administrative delay.

 At the SEC, for example, action memos may run 50-75 pages in length and perhaps five to ten of them are circulated each week. In addition, the Wells responses or white papers are often lengthy and some commissioners read them in full.[[129]](#footnote-129) Greenlighting is considered at formal SEC meetings which are sometimes contentious. Thus, a substantial portion of the time of SEC commissioners is devoted to enforcement matters.

 Agencies that handle the greenlighting function through notational voting spend less time in meetings but the members must still read the lengthy files (although no doubt many of them have time only to read the executive summaries). At FERC, the agency heads make greenlighting decisions in several stages. Each stage generates lengthy memos, but voting is generally done through a notational process rather than in-person meetings. The same is true at FCC where enforcement matters are seldom taken up during commission meetings.

 SEC interviewees estimated that perhaps 40% or more of the time of agency heads is taken up in enforcement matters, including but not limited to charging decisions and settlement approvals.[[130]](#footnote-130) At FERC, estimates were much lower, perhaps in the 10% range because relatively few enforcement cases make it that far.[[131]](#footnote-131) One former FTC commissioner estimated spending half of work time on enforcement issues, but thought the time investment was well worth it.[[132]](#footnote-132)

 Obviously, agency heads pay a substantial opportunity cost in order to achieve this level of involvement in enforcement issues.[[133]](#footnote-133) This is time the heads could devote to other important responsibilities such as rulemaking, ratemaking, liaisons with other agencies, study of the problems faced by the industry, development of policy, or consideration of adjudicatory records at the time of final decision.

**D. WEIGHING COSTS AND BENEFITS**

 Weighing the case for and against greenlighting, my conclusion is that the greenlighting function is valuable and should be preserved in agencies where caseload permits it. Greenlighting produces substantial advantages in terms of public administration norms, such as the need for accountability of staff, improved supervision of staff, the sentinel effect, and the benefits of internal separation of powers. Greenlighting also mitigates the principal-agent problem. I believe that these benefits outweigh the problems of confirmation bias and inefficiency, but this article will suggest further checks and balances in section V that could alleviate both concerns.

**IV. LEGALITY OF GREENLIGHTING**

 This section discusses arguments that greenlighting violates due process or the APA.

**A. DUE PROCESS**

 Andrew Vollmer argues that a target of the SEC is denied due process when the agency heads greenlight a complaint and later issue the final agency decision.[[134]](#footnote-134) I disagree with Vollmer’s analysis. The Supreme Court has consistently rejected constitutional attacks that arise out of the structure of combined-function administrative agencies.

 The leading case on this issue is *Withrow v. Larkin.*[[135]](#footnote-135) In *Withrow,* the Supreme Court assumed that the heads of a state medical licensing agency had personally investigated a physician’s conduct, authorized the filing of a criminal complaint against the physician, and then adjudicated a revocation of his license. The Court unanimously rejected the physician’s due process claim. It held that agency heads could exercise the functions of both investigation and adjudication in the same case, absent particularized facts indicating that the heads had prejudged the case. The Court pointed out that there is no incompatibility between the agency filing a complaint based on probable cause and a subsequent adjudicatory decision rendered when all the evidence is in that there has been no violation of the statute.[[136]](#footnote-136) The *Withrow* Court was obviously concerned that a contrary decision would cast doubt on the practices of countless federal, state and local licensing agencies.

 The *Withrow* decision is supported by the principle of necessity—if the agency heads were disqualified by their involvement in prosecution, there would be no way to adjudicate the case and thus no way to revoke the doctor’s license. *Withrow* is consistent with several earlier Supreme Court decisions that held that agency adjudicatory decisionmakers are not biased simply by reason of their involvement in earlier agency proceedings.[[137]](#footnote-137)

 Under *Withrow,* it seems clear that due process is not violated when agency heads greenlight a charging decision and later make the final adjudicatory decision in the same case, absent some further evidence that they had prejudged the issues. Since *Withrow*, federal courts have consistently rejected arguments that agency heads who exercised overlapping functions could not fairly adjudicate a case.[[138]](#footnote-138)

 Despite this authority, Vollmer argues that due process is violated when agency heads greenlight and later adjudicate the same case. His analysis is based on *Williams v. Pennsylvania.*[[139]](#footnote-139) *Williams* was a death penalty case in which Ronald Castille had previously served as a prosecutor. Castille later became a justice on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court and voted to uphold the death penalty in the same case he had helped to prosecute. The Supreme Court held that this combination of functions violated due process.

 It seems plain that *Williams* is distinguishable from the administrative greenlighting issue. It is shocking and inexplicable that a justice on a state supreme court would not disqualify himself in a case he had prosecuted. It is a gross breach of judicial ethics for a judge to decide a case in which the judge served as counsel in an earlier phase of the case, let alone a death penalty case.[[140]](#footnote-140) The *Williams* scenario is likely a situation that will never recur. It easily fits into the *Withrow* exception for particularized facts that reveal prejudgment. In contrast, there is no breach of judicial ethics and no particularized facts indicating prejudgment when an agency head greenlights a prosecution, then decides the case. Such as action is routine, generally accepted, and has occurred in countless cases.

 By concentrating only on the SEC, Vollmer fails to deal with the systemic effect of holding that greenlighting plus adjudication is a due process violation. Such a decision would have an enormously disruptive effect on the state and federal administrative process because greenlighting is so common, particularly in licensing agencies. The Supreme Court is reluctant to decree due process principles that would have widespread effect of this kind.[[141]](#footnote-141) Such a decision would also have the effect of holding unconstitutional the “agency head” exception in section 554(d) of the APA,[[142]](#footnote-142) a step the Supreme Court would be reluctant to take. The *Williams* decision does not offend the principle of necessity because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court could have decided the case if Castille had recused himself. In contrast, a decision preventing all agency heads who had greenlighted a prosecution from deciding the case would frequently immobilize the agency for lack of a quorum, thus making it impossible to render a final decision. Thus, Vollmer’s argument that greenlighting at the SEC or elsewhere violates due process is not persuasive.

 Vollmer argues that to solve the due process problem, an agency member who voted to greenlight a case should be disqualified from voting on the final decision. Whether that proposal should be adopted as a matter of policy is discussed below.[[143]](#footnote-143)

**B. THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE ACT**

 Section 554(d) of the APA imposes a separation of functions requirement that prevents a staff member involved in investigation of a case from serving as an adjudicator in the same case (or a substantially related one) or as an adviser to the adjudicator.[[144]](#footnote-144) However, section 554(d) does not apply “(C) to the agency or a member or members of the body comprising the agency.”

 This “agency head” exception was inserted because Congress felt that application of separation of functions to the agency head would damage the agency’s ability to conduct law enforcement.[[145]](#footnote-145) As a result, according to a number of cases, the APA allows agency heads to engage in a prosecution function such as greenlighting, then participate in the agency’s final adjudicatory decision.[[146]](#footnote-146) The *Withrow* decision contains a dictum confirming that the APA permits agency heads to engage in investigation and prosecution in the same case they adjudicate.[[147]](#footnote-147)

**V. ACCOUNTABILITY MECHANISMS AND GREENLIGHTING**

 Part III of this paper discussed the fundamental rationale for the greenlighting function. Agency head review of charging decision serves as an accountability mechanism that promotes public administration values and helps to correct principal-agent misalignments. Nevertheless, Part III acknowledged concerns about greenlighting because of possible confirmation bias and efficiency issues. This section discusses accountability mechanisms that might be employed in connection with the greenlighting process and that might alleviate these concerns. These mechanisms exist in some agencies or have been suggested in the literature. There are, of course, structural changes that would address these concerns, such as eliminating combined-function agencies, but such options are beyond the scope of this article.[[148]](#footnote-148)

**A. MECHANISMS THAT ALLOW TARGETS INPUT INTO CHARGING DECISION**

 As discussed in Part II, the SEC, FTC, FERC, and NLRB employ pre-charging notice and comment procedures.[[149]](#footnote-149) These formalized procedures invite targets to submit memoranda designed to dissuade the staff from charging them and supplement the informal interchange between the target’s attorneys and agency enforcement staff that routinely occurs during the investigation process.

 When the SEC staff tentatively decides that a complaint should issue or that the agency should seek judicial enforcement, it formulates a memorandum to the target (the “Wells notice”) that summarizes the factual and legal predicates for the complaint and may (but need not) disclose investigative material from the agency’s file. The target is then entitled to submit a written rebuttal (the “Wells response”). That response is designed both to dissuade the staff from seeking a Commission greenlight and to influence the agency heads not to greenlight the complaint if the staff persists. A strong Wells response is also a strategic tool used by target lawyers to strengthen their position in settlement negotiations.[[150]](#footnote-150)

 As discussed above,[[151]](#footnote-151) the SEC staff now often avoids the Wells procedure because the Dodd-Frank Act requires issuance of a complaint within 180 days of a Wells notice. In addition, public companies believe they must disclose issuance of a Wells notice and thus prefer that the SEC omit the procedure. Instead, the staff informally notifies the target of its intention to recommend that the Commission charge the target. The target then is invited to prepare a “white paper” that serves the same function as a Wells response. The FTC’s white paper process is similar to that practiced by the SEC.

 SEC commissioners told me that they and their advisory staff take Wells responses or white papers seriously.[[152]](#footnote-152) These submissions sometimes persuade the SEC heads that issuance of a complaint is contrary to their policy priorities, that the case is weak, or that the complaint should be narrowed. Defense lawyers appreciate the Wells and white paper process and often use it to extract more information from the staff than might otherwise be disclosed.[[153]](#footnote-153) My interviewees expressed unanimous support for the Wells or white paper procedures.[[154]](#footnote-154)

 FERC provides two distinct opportunities for the target to influence the charging decision. After the staff decides that a complaint should issue, it generates a “preliminary findings memo.” The target has the opportunity to file a responsive brief. These documents are presented to the agency heads when they consider whether to permit the staff to enter into settlement negotiations.[[155]](#footnote-155) If the case does not settle, the staff produces a Rule 1b.19 memorandum, a process modelled after the SEC’s Wells notice. The Rule 1b.19 notice again sets forth the facts and legal analysis supporting the staff’s decision to seek a charging decision, but more briefly than the preliminary findings memo. The target has 30 days to respond to the Rule 1b.19 notice. The agency heads consider the Rule 1b.19 notice and the response when they decide whether to issue a charging decision (an OSC in FERC parlance) or seek federal court enforcement. Several interviewees thought the Rule 1b.19 procedure was redundant since it duplicates the preliminary findings memo and response.[[156]](#footnote-156) The target has a third opportunity to state its case by filing a brief after issuance of the OSC.

 The regional offices of the NLRB that investigate unfair labor practice charges offer targets the ability to file a position paper in response to the charge. Targets also have the opportunity to meet with regional staff and (in cases where there is an appeal against the charge or refusal to charge) with regional directors and with the GC if the latter agrees to the meeting.

 The FCC does not provide a formalized notice and comment system prior to issuance of a Notice of Apparent Liability (NAL). The target can file a detailed response after the staff issues the NAL. The response is intended primarily for the benefit of the Commissioners who will be called on to greenlight the complaint and, later, will adjudicate it.

 In my opinion, the notice and comment procedure employed by the SEC, FTC, FERC, and NLRB during the pre-charging phase of enforcement is useful and should be considered best practice. The formalized ability to comment contributes to a sense by private parties that they are being treated fairly and helps them decide whether to settle. The process facilitates reasoned decisionmaking by the enforcement staff and helps the agency heads produce an informed greenlighting decision. It furthers what Michaels called internal separation of powers.[[157]](#footnote-157) I would not, however, recommend that agencies provide two separate opportunities of this kind, as occurs in FERC practice. A double notice and comment procedure seems redundant and increases costs for both targets and agencies without corresponding benefit.

**B. ABILITY OF TARGET TO COMMUNICATE WITH INDIVIDUAL AGENCY MEMBERS**

 Several agencies permit targets to communicate with the agency heads prior to their greenlighting decision. After the FTC staff recommends issuance of a complaint, the target is entitled to meet separately with each of the five commissioners in order to attempt to dissuade them from greenlighting the complaint. Commission staff are usually present at these meetings. Because no complaint has issued, the APA’s ban on outsider ex parte communications to agency decisionmakers[[158]](#footnote-158) is not applicable. A similar practice of meetings between targets and commissioners exists at the FCC but is employed less often than at the FTC.[[159]](#footnote-159)

 Several FTC interviewees support the FTC ex parte meeting procedure.[[160]](#footnote-160) Former FTC commissioners found these meetings enlightening, since they are otherwise exposed mostly to the staff’s arguments before greenlighting the complaint.[[161]](#footnote-161) The meetings tend to offset criticisms that the commissioners are out of touch and removed from practicalities.[[162]](#footnote-162) Some private lawyers (including former FTC staff) think the meetings can be a useful vehicle to persuade a commissioner that the case is weaker than the staff says it is.[[163]](#footnote-163) At times, the commissioners can broker settlements. Other private lawyers refer to the FTC meetings as “last rites” and think they are a costly waste of time.[[164]](#footnote-164) My interviewees were also skeptical about the value of meetings between targets and FCC commissioners which were regarded as useless.[[165]](#footnote-165)

 Staff members and former heads at other agencies were unenthusiastic about the FTC’s and FCC’s one-on-one practice.[[166]](#footnote-166) I agree with their criticisms. These meetings seem wasteful of the precious time of the agency heads and of staff members who sit in on them.[[167]](#footnote-167) The process is costly for clients who must pay their lawyers to engage in numerous separate meetings, even though it is unlikely that the meetings will have much practical impact. The meetings can worsen confirmation bias because the heads learn still more about the case at the pre-complaint stage, including material that might never become part of the record.[[168]](#footnote-168)

 FERC permits targets to submit written (but not oral) communications to the agency heads during the investigation process. This approach (a holdover from prior practice existing before the FERC acquired civil penalty authority) is less time consuming and costly than the ex parte in-person meetings conducted by the FTC and FCC. Some FERC practitioners send letters to the commissioners frequently; others never do. Whether such communications are useful to targets or to FERC is debatable. Some interviewees thought that the letters might prompt the recipients to communicate with the staff to better understand the issues.[[169]](#footnote-169) Others thought the practice was counter-productive since such communications might prejudice the staff against a target that attempted to go over their heads.[[170]](#footnote-170)

**C. SEPARATION OF FUNCTION DURING INVESTIGATION**

 William Scherman and his co-authors proposed changes to FERC’s ex parte communication and separation of functions rules.[[171]](#footnote-171) Under the existing FERC rules, as in most agencies, ex parte communications to decisionmakers or their advisers either by outsiders or by adversarial staff members such as prosecutors and investigators are prohibited after FERC makes a charging decision by issuing an order to show cause (OSC). However, such communications can and do occur before the agency makes the decision to charge.[[172]](#footnote-172)

 Under Scherman’s proposal, these prohibitions would apply at an earlier stage of the proceeding, perhaps when the Rule 1b.19 notice issues (meaning staff has decided to recommend charging the target). His article expressed concern about the fairness of allowing the staff unfettered access to the Commission during the investigatory and greenlighting phases of the case, while the ability of targets to communicate with agency heads is limited to written submissions.[[173]](#footnote-173) Under Scherman’s proposal, meetings between the staff and agency heads concerning greenlighting would be on the record rather than ex parte and the target could participate in such meetings. In a subsequent article, members of the FERC staff and outside lawyers strongly criticized Scherman’s proposal.[[174]](#footnote-174)

 Most interviewees opposed Scherman’s proposal, whether at FERC or at other agencies. The interviewees believe that the staff needs to conduct a candid and robust discussion with agency members about whether to greenlight a case. If the target’s representatives were present or if the discussion was on the record, staff could not level with the agency heads about the weaknesses in the case, or the political or policy issues it creates. or the terms on which it might be settled.[[175]](#footnote-175) The need for candid discussion about charging is the reason for the Sunshine Act exemption of meetings devoted to initiation of litigation.[[176]](#footnote-176)

**D. DELEGATION TO ENFORCEMENT STAFF IN ROUTINE CASES**

 The 1941 Report of the Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure expressed concern with the problem of confirmation bias resulting from greenlighting. To alleviate the problem, the Report suggested that agencies delegate to staff the decision to issue a complaint in cases that raise only applications of well-established legal principles. Such cases might present difficulties of proof but would otherwise be routine. Delegation of the charging decision in routine cases would not inhibit the agency’s use of adjudication for policymaking. However, in cases raising important policy issues or those that involve extension of existing precedents or new departures, the agency heads should be responsible for making the charging decision.[[177]](#footnote-177)

 Such delegations are in effect at several agencies. The FCC staff has power to charge civil penalties below a certain amount ($100,000 for common carriers, $25,000 for others), so that the commissioners need not consider the majority of penalty cases. At FERC, penalties arising from reliability violations that are assessed by an industry self-regulatory process can be processed without agency head involvement.[[178]](#footnote-178) In the NLRB, over 90% of complaints processed by regional offices involve routine, well-settled applications of law, and are filed without any involvement of the GC or the GC’s staff, even though, in theory, the GC is responsible for all NLRB prosecution decisions.[[179]](#footnote-179)

 Delegation to staff of complaint issuance in routine cases is a good idea, especially in agencies with substantial enforcement caseloads. Delegation would reduce the number of cases in which confirmation bias is a concern because the agency heads would never see them before the final adjudicatory stage. Delegation should also be efficiency-enhancing by reducing the amount of time the heads need to spend on enforcement decisions. Thus, agency heads could adopt procedural rules setting forth classes of cases that the staff could initiate on its own. Of course, such rules are possible only if allowed by statute, because some statutes require agency head approval of every complaint.[[180]](#footnote-180)

 Nevertheless, most of the interviewees opposed delegation to the staff of complaint issuance. They thought it would be difficult to identify precisely which cases are routine or unimportant.[[181]](#footnote-181) At FERC, relatively few enforcement cases are litigated rather than settled; the ones that remain tend to involve policy questions.[[182]](#footnote-182) Even if the case turns on evidentiary issues rather than disputed legal questions, these evidentiary issues may be controversial and of fundamental importance, especially in competition and securities cases. Even routine cases involve the expenditure of resources and can create precedents that may have important effects on the regulated industry. Former commission members think that complaints in routine cases should be approved by politically responsible agency heads in light of the importance of the cases to the particular parties[[183]](#footnote-183) and the sentinel effect.[[184]](#footnote-184) Private lawyers want the commission-level bite at the apple, even if the case seems routine.

**E. DISQUALIFICATION OF AGENCY HEADS WHO PARTICIPATED IN CHARGING DECISIONS**

 Agency members who voted to greenlight a case could be disqualified from voting on the final adjudicatory decision. Andrew Vollmer, who was a former SEC staff member, has strongly advocated this proposal.[[185]](#footnote-185)

 One practical problem with Vollmer’s proposal is that such disqualifications might render the agency unable to muster a quorum to vote on the final decision, causing the decision in the case to be suspended indefinitely. This would not occur frequently, given the fairly rapid turnover of agency heads, but it would occur occasionally, especially during presidential transitions when the confirmation process causes substantial delays in filling vacancies. Virtually everyone I interviewed opposed this proposal, including many who now serve in the defense bar.[[186]](#footnote-186)

 More fundamentally, Vollmer’s proposal would force agency heads (at least those who have not decided to leave the agency in the near future) to make a difficult choice. Should they disqualify themselves from greenlighting a case to preserve the ability to vote on the final decision, or should they retain the greenlighting function and give up their vote on the final adjudicatory decision? Some former agency heads who answered this question said they would opt out of the charging decision because of the importance of being able to make policy through the adjudicatory decision.[[187]](#footnote-187) Others said they would opt out of the final decision because the charging decisions are so important and so much more numerous than cases that survive all the way to the end of the adjudicatory process.[[188]](#footnote-188)

 As argued above, participation of agency heads in the charging decision is valuable as a check on prosecutors and as an element of policymaking. It would be unfortunate if commissioners opted out of that function. And it would be equally unfortunate if some were disqualified from taking part in the final decision process. That process involves collegial effort and compromise of diverse policy perspectives and often entails establishing agency policy for the future.[[189]](#footnote-189) In my view, these structural concerns are more important than preventing confirmation bias.

**F. REMOVAL OF AGENCY HEADS FROM GREENLIGHTING: THE NLRB MODEL**

 Since passage of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, NLRB members lack the power to make charging decisions in unfair labor practice (ULP) cases.[[190]](#footnote-190) Instead, the GC makes the charging decisions and is politically accountable for them. Much has been written about the separation of prosecution and adjudication functions in the NLRB.[[191]](#footnote-191) Several articles . have recommended that other combined function enforcement agencies follow the NLRB model.[[192]](#footnote-192)

 Although NLRB members play no prosecutorial role in most ULP cases, the separation of prosecution and adjudication is not complete. The members decide whether to approve the GC’s recommendation that the Board seek a temporary injunction in ULP cases (so-called 10(j) cases).[[193]](#footnote-193) Thus, under the NLRB model, the agency heads greenlight the particularly sensitive temporary injunction cases, but not the more routine and far more numerous ULP complaints in which no injunction is sought.

 NLRB regional offices file between 800 and 1200 ULP complaints each year. This heavy caseload would make it practically impossible for the NLRB agency heads to be involved in charging decisions in any meaningful way.[[194]](#footnote-194) The agency heads see between ten and one hundred 10(j) cases each year which is a more manageable task. Limiting the Board’s greenlighting function to 10(j) cases makes sense, because 10(j) cases are more significant than routine ULP cases. The Board seeks an injunction when the conduct being enjoined may inflict serious injury that could not be remedied by a later adjudicatory decision. For example, the Board might seek a temporary injunction against employer violations that interrupt a union organizing campaign. An injunction is appropriate in such cases because otherwise the adjudicatory decision would occur long after the momentum behind the organizing campaign dissipated.[[195]](#footnote-195)

 Confirmation bias remains a potential issue in 10(j) cases since Board members exercise both prosecution and adjudicatory functions in those cases. My interview subjects doubted that the problem was serious, because the GC’s written request for Board approval of the injunction accepts the credibility of the complainant and does not include much of the factual and evidentiary material that the prosecutors have assembled. When a 10(j) case comes to the Board after an ALJ decision, the record looks completely different than it did at the complaint stage, because it contains the respondent’s evidence and the ALJ’s credibility determinations.[[196]](#footnote-196)

 The separation of prosecution and adjudication at the NLRB in ULP cases can create principal-agency problems when the views of the GC and the Board members misalign. These principal-agent problems arise most frequently when presidential administrations change and the 3-2 political balance on the board switches, while the GC holds over.[[197]](#footnote-197) The GC may refuse to issue complaints in cases that the heads would have prosecuted.[[198]](#footnote-198) Alternatively, the GC may issue complaints that the heads would not have authorized.[[199]](#footnote-199) Since most cases settle (at least 90%), the Board never has an opportunity to pass on the policy issues raised in settled cases.

 One example of this sort of conflict arises out of the GC’s valuable advice-giving function. If the GC disagrees with Board-made law and hopes to change it, the GC can advise charging parties to file particular types of charges and regional offices to issue complaints in those cases. Of course, the Board makes the final call and can reject the GC’s initiative. Charging parties are allowed to participate in ALJ hearings and can introduce witnesses and argument supporting their view, perhaps disagreeing with the GC’s approach. On the other hand, the Board will be unable to change existing law if the GC disagrees and declines to charge cases raising the issue.[[200]](#footnote-200)

 Another area in which the general counsel and the agency heads might come into conflict arises in the area of judicial enforcement. Unlike other independent agencies, the Board’s attorneys handle litigation for the Board through the Court of Appeal level. Conflict might arise when the GC is called on to enforce a Board decision in court with which the GC disagrees (as could occur after a change in presidential administration, where the GC is a holdover). Such problems have occurred in the past, but not in recent years.[[201]](#footnote-201)

 An additional problem with the independent GC is that it creates a duplicate power center within the agency. The GC is a de facto agency head whose practical power may well exceed those of the five NLRB members. Particularly during periods of budget stringency and uncertainty, such as have occurred in recent years, the board and GC have disagreed about management and budgetary issues, such as how to make the necessary budget cuts and how to allocate limited resources. A recent example of GC-Board conflict resulted from differences of opinion about replacement of the Board’s outmoded IT system. In addition, the GC makes staff hiring decisions (except over the Board members’ personal staffs). GC hiring decisions have given rise to conflict with Board members.[[202]](#footnote-202)

 In my interviews, I found little enthusiasm for the NLRB model in other federal combined-function agencies. Most interviewees favored having the agency heads make charging decisions, both in the interest of constraining prosecutors and articulating policy.[[203]](#footnote-203) They were concerned by the problem of the general counsel being out of sync with the agency heads and the creation of a competing power center.[[204]](#footnote-204) They feared that an independent general counsel might increase partisanship.[[205]](#footnote-205) A minority of interviewees were open to the idea.[[206]](#footnote-206)

**G. ENFORCEMENT GUIDELINES**

 One way to reduce administrative prosecutorial discretion is through the adoption of guidance documents that establish enforcement priorities and criteria.[[207]](#footnote-207) As conditions in the regulated industry change, or as new agency heads with different priorities are appointed, the guidelines can and should be updated.[[208]](#footnote-208) Such guidelines provide readily available guidance for both staff and agency heads and help to assure more consistent charging decisions. A concern with making such guidelines publicly available (as they must be under FOIA)[[209]](#footnote-209) is that they can undermine deterrence by informing the regulated industry of what cases are unlikely to be prosecuted.

 Nevertheless, federal agencies have found it feasible to establish prosecution guidelines that at least suggest the factors that prosecutors and investigators should consider. The FCC adopted guidelines for upward and downward adjustment of forfeiture penalties.[[210]](#footnote-210) The NLRB Office of Advice furnishes detailed guidance to regional offices about enforcement criteria and policies in unfair labor practice cases. In addition, the General Counsel adopted detailed case-handling instructions (publicly available) to regional offices about every aspect of processing ULP, representation and compliance cases.[[211]](#footnote-211) A useful FERC guideline lists the factors that staff should consider in deciding whether to open an investigation.[[212]](#footnote-212)

**H. PEER REVIEW OF PROSECUTION DECISIONS**

Another approach to limiting and checking administrative prosecutorial discretion is to institute a system of peer review of charging decisions. Peer review is common in post-bureaucratic public administration, such as the “mortality-morbidity” reviews of adverse events that occur in hospitals.[[213]](#footnote-213) The idea is that a team of staff prosecutors and investigators would conduct periodic review of a sample of prior decisions by the staff to charge or not to charge. The objective of such peer review is to enhance learning of staff decisionmakers about the prosecutorial decisionmaking process and to achieve more consistency for future decisions. The team would ascertain whether prior charging decisions led to successful and cost-effective outcomes and whether these decisions complied with the agency’s prosecutorial guidelines and procedural requirements.

**I. STRUCTURAL SOLUTIONS TO THE CONFIRMATION BIAS PROBLEM**

 There are a number of possible structural changes to the organization of combined function agencies that would remove the possibility of confirmation bias. Except for considering the NLRB option for stripping agency heads of greenlighting power,[[214]](#footnote-214) I have not explored these options. They are beyond the scope of this article and most of them do not seem politically feasible.[[215]](#footnote-215)

 For example, Congress might require that all enforcement adjudication be situated in federal court rather than being conducted through internal agency adjudication,[[216]](#footnote-216) or that a target would have the right to remove an administrative enforcement case to federal court (as occurs in the case of FERC[[217]](#footnote-217)) or that the agency must bring a de novo federal court action to collect a civil penalty (as in the case of the FCC).[[218]](#footnote-218)

 Another set of options, often referred to as external separation of functions, calls for creation of an adjudicatory tribunal, as is common in Commonwealth countries, either for specific agencies (as in Canada) or for all enforcement agencies (as in Australia and the UK).[[219]](#footnote-219) Under the tribunal model, an enforcement agency engages in rulemaking, investigation and prosecution, but a separate agency makes the resulting adjudicatory decision. The U.S. employs tribunals in cases involving worker safety, mining safety, and federal taxation. Many states situate adjudication in separate tribunals in their unemployment compensation and workers compensation systems.[[220]](#footnote-220)

 Still another approach is delegation of the internal appeal function to an appellate review board (such as the Environmental Appeals Board[[221]](#footnote-221)) or a judicial officer (as occurs in the Department of Agriculture[[222]](#footnote-222)). The delegation could cover certain classes of cases that are likely to present only factual issues or it could cover all enforcement cases. The agency heads might retain discretionary review power over decisions of the intermediate review board or judicial officer in cases presenting important policy issues.[[223]](#footnote-223) Delegations of final decisional authority are quite common in the administrative state[[224]](#footnote-224) and might be attractive for agencies with substantial caseloads or serious backlogs at the agency head level. Delegation of the power to make the final adjudicatory decision would promote efficient use of the limited time of the agency heads and reduce delays in making final decisions. Such delegation would also limit the number of cases subject to potential confirmation bias.

**VI. CONCLUSION**

 Combined-function enforcement agencies should engage in greenlighting if their caseload permits them to do so. Greenlighting means that the agency head (including all of the heads of a multiple-member agency) should be responsible for the decision of whether to approve charging decisions made by the staff. Agency head approval of charging decisions assures that the choice of enforcement targets aligns with the priorities of the agency head and is a wise allocation of scarce enforcement resources. Greenlighting is a powerful accountability mechanism to control the exercise of prosecutorial discretion—a problem that pervades the world of criminal and administrative prosecution.

 Agencies engaged in greenlighting should require the staff to engage in a structured written notice and comment process, whereby targets can try to persuade the staff not to charge. In addition, when the staff seeks agency member approval of a charging decision, it should generate a detailed memorandum to the members setting forth the facts uncovered by the investigation and applicable legal analysis to assist them in deciding whether to approve a charging decision or settlement.

Because greenlighting may present problems of confirmation bias and inefficiency, agencies should consider whether their enforcement docket includes classes of cases that are sufficiently routine that the charging decision can be delegated to the staff or that the final adjudicatory decision could be delegated to a judicial officer or a review board. And agencies should consider adoption of guidelines that set forth priorities for exercising its prosecutorial discretion and institution of a peer review process at the staff level. With these refinements, combined-function agencies should continue to employ the greenlighting process when it is practicable to do so.

1. \* Professor of Law Emeritus, UCLA Law School; Dean’s Executive Professor of Law, Santa Clara Law School. This article is derived from a research report submitted to the Administrative Conference of the United States. See <https://www.acus.gov/report/greenlighting-administrative-prosecution-checks-and-balances-charging-decisions>. Many thanks to former ACUS Executive Director Matthew Wiener and to Jeremy Graboyes, ACUS Director of Public and Interagency Programs, for their assistance in preparing that report.

I am grateful to the interview subjects who provided the data for this article, whose anonymity I have protected. See text at beginning of Part II for discussion of interview methodology. The author also thanks David Ball, David Engstrom, Eric Goldman, Pratheepan Gulasekaram, Dan Ho, Jon Michaels, Michelle Oberman, Cathy Sandoval, Mira Scholten, William Simon, David Sloss, and Tseming Yang for comments on this article.

 The word ”target” refers to the private-sector subject of an administrative investigation and prosecution. Numerous other terms are used including “charged party,” “respondent” or “defendant.” [↑](#footnote-ref-1)
2. The term “agency heads” refers to the members of the agency. [↑](#footnote-ref-2)
3. “Greenlighting” is a term often used in the entertainment industry. It refers to an executive-level decision by a financing or distribution company to accept a proposal for a film or television show. I also borrowed the greenlight metaphor from Harlow and Rawlings. *See* Carol Harlow and Richard Rawlings, Law and Administration (2004), discussed *infra* note 93. [↑](#footnote-ref-3)
4. The five agencies I studied have multiple members. However, I believe my findings apply to combined-function agencies that have only a single head. The five agencies are subject to the adjudication provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). I refer to hearings governed by the APA as Type A adjudication. The findings of this study appear equally applicable to combined function agencies outside the APA that also conduct evidentiary hearings (so-called Type B adjudication). For further discussion of the distinctions between Types A, B, and C adjudication see Michael Asimow, Federal Administrative Adjudication Outside the Administrative Procedure Act 15-24 (ACUS 2019) [↑](#footnote-ref-4)
5. It is beyond the scope of this article to compare the charging process in the administrative and criminal justice systems. A common theme in the literature on criminal prosecution is that the charging decisions of prosecutors (who settle perhaps 95% of their cases) are largely unaccountable. See Daniel C. Richman, “Accounting for Prosecutors,” in Prosecutors and Democracy: A Cross-National Study, Maximo Langer & David Alan Sklansky eds. (2017); Rachel E. Barkow, *Foreword: Overseeing Agency Enforcement,* 84 Geo. Wash. L. Rev 1129 (2016); Rachel E. Barkow, *Institutional Design and the Policing of Prosecutors: Lessons from Administrative Law,* 61 Stan. L. Rev. 869 (2009); Samuel J. Levine, *Disciplinary Regulation of Prosecutorial Discretion*, 16 Ohio St. J. Crim. L. 237, 237 n.1 (2019); James Vorenberg, *Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial Power,* 94 Harv. L. Rev. 1521 (1981); Ellen Podgor, *The Dichotomy Between Overcriminalization and Underregulation,* 70 Amer. U. L. Rev. 1061, 1093 (2021). [↑](#footnote-ref-5)
6. See Edward Rubin, *It’s Time to Make the Administrative Procedure Act Administrative,* 89 Cornell L. R. 95, 125 (2003); Angela J. Davis, “Prosecutors, Democracy, and Race,” in Langer & Sklansky, *supra* note 5. [↑](#footnote-ref-6)
7. See discussion of agency practice in Part II. The agencies discussed in Part II settle between 30% and 95% of charged cases before hearing. [↑](#footnote-ref-7)
8. There is a large and informative literature on the administrative enforcement function, but little of it concentrates on prosecutorial discretion and greenlighting in combined-function agencies. See Kate Andrias, *The President’s Enforcement Power,* 88 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1031 (2013); Eugene Bardach & Robert A. Kagan, Going by the Book (1982); Rachel Barkow, *Foreword: Overseeing Agency Enforcement,* 84 Geo. Wash. L. Rev 1129 (2016); Stephanie Bornstein, *Public-Private Co-Enforcement Litigation,* 104 Minn. L. Rev. 811(2019); John Braithwaite et al., *An Enforcement Taxonomy of Regulatory Agencies,* 9 Law & Policy 323 (1989); Jackson Frazier, *Perfecting Participation: Arbitrariness and Accountability in Agency Enforcement,* 96 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 2094 (2021); Margaret H. Lemos, *Democratic Enforcement: Accountability and Independence for the Litigation State,* 102 Corn. L. Rev. 929 (2017); Daniel L. Markell & Robert L. Glicksman, *A Holistic Look at Agency Enforcement,* 93 N.C. L. Rev. 1 (2014); Max Minzner, *Should Agencies Enforce?* 99 Minn. L. Rev. 2113 (2015); Jodi L. Short, *The Politics of Regulatory Enforcement and Compliance: Theorizing and Operationalizing Political Influences,*  SSRN 3645120 (2019); Mila Sohoni, *Crackdowns*, 103 Va. L. Rev. 31 (2017); Rory Van Loo, *Regulatory Monitors: Policing Firms in the Compliance Era*, 119 Colum. L. Rev. 369 (2019). [↑](#footnote-ref-8)
9. Dodd-Frank Act §929P(a), 15 U.S.C. §§77h1, 78u-2, 80a-9, 80b-3. [↑](#footnote-ref-9)
10. Gideon Mark, *SEC and CFTC Administrative Proceedings*, 19 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 45, 53-59 (2016). [↑](#footnote-ref-10)
11. 34 F.4th 446 (5th Cir. 2022), rehearing denied, 51 F.4th 644 (5th Cir. 2022). [↑](#footnote-ref-11)
12. At one time, the Commission had to approve issuance of subpoenas but that authority has now been delegated to individual investigators. Under current practice, subpoenas must be approved by the Director of Enforcement, but not by the Commission. [↑](#footnote-ref-12)
13. 17 C.F.R. §202.5(b), (c); SEC Enforcement Manual §2.4. [↑](#footnote-ref-13)
14. 15 U.S.C. §78d-5(a)(1). This provision allows the Director of Enforcement to extend the period for an additional 180 days in complex cases. If additional time is needed, the Commission must approve the extension. 15 U.S.C. §78d-5(a)(2). [↑](#footnote-ref-14)
15. SEC 1, 7, 8. The white paper procedure existed before the development of the Wells notice. As a practical matter, the informal communication may provide as much information as a Wells notice. SEC 8. [↑](#footnote-ref-15)
16. Section 2.4 of the SEC’s Enforcement Manual provides that the staff should consider whether “access to portions of the file would be a productive way for both the staff and the recipient of the Wells notice to assess the strength of the evidence that forms the basis for the staff’s proposed recommendations.” [↑](#footnote-ref-16)
17. SEC 7. [↑](#footnote-ref-17)
18. Interviewees estimated that 70 to 80% of cases are settled before hearing. SEC 7, 8; Barkow *supra* note 8 at 1164. [↑](#footnote-ref-18)
19. SEC 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-19)
20. See SEC Enforcement Manual §2.5 for details concerning Commission consideration and seriatim voting. [↑](#footnote-ref-20)
21. Enforcement Manual §2.5.2.3; SEC 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-21)
22. SEC 1, 2, 4, 7. One current member has frequently opposed enforcement. See “SEC’s Newest Republican Emerges as One-Woman Party of ‘No,’” Bloomberg Law News, Securities & Capital Markets, May 7, 2018; “SEC’s Peirce Details ‘The Why Behind the No’ Votes on Enforcement, *id*., May 11, 2018. [↑](#footnote-ref-22)
23. https://www.sec.gov/files/34-94820\_0.pdf [↑](#footnote-ref-23)
24. Investigations must be approved by the relevant bureau directors, the Bureau of Economics, and the Evaluation Committee. [↑](#footnote-ref-24)
25. FTC 4. Many of the details of the FTC’s investigatory process were set forth in the FTC Operating Manual, but the Manual was withdrawn and is no longer available online. [↑](#footnote-ref-25)
26. Numerous authors have expressed discomfort with the FTC’s combined-function structure. Carl A. Auerbach, *The Federal Trade Commission: Internal Organization and Procedure,* 48 Minn. L Rev. 383, 418-24 (1963); Terry Calvani, *The Federal Trade Commission: A Proposal for Radical Change,* 34 Antitrust Bull. 185, 202-03 (1989); Committee on Trade Regulation, *Federal Trade Commission Procedure for Issuance of Complaints,* 30 Rec. Ass’n Bar of City of NY 213 (1975) (recommending creation of separate adjudicatory tribunal); Philip Elman, *Administrative Reform of the Federal Trade Commission,* 59 Georgetown L.J. 777, 810-12 (1971). [↑](#footnote-ref-26)
27. In 2014, over 95% of FTC consumer protection cases settled, most within 60 days of issuance of the complaint. See Prentiss Cox, Amy Widman & Mark Totten, *Strategies of Public UDAP Enforcement,* 55 Harv. J. on Legis. 37, 63 (2018). [↑](#footnote-ref-27)
28. FTC 1, 5. [↑](#footnote-ref-28)
29. FTC 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. This practice is discussed further in Part V. B. [↑](#footnote-ref-29)
30. 15 U.S.C. §45(b); 16 C.F.R. §3.11(a). [↑](#footnote-ref-30)
31. FTC 1, 4, 5. [↑](#footnote-ref-31)
32. FTC 3, 4, 5. According to FTC 3, charging decisions are made by the chair unless overridden by the votes of three commissioners. In addition, the chair appoints senior staff members who reflect the chair‘s views about enforcement priorities. In July 2022, the FTC decided (by a 3-2 vote) to *reject* the staff’s advice and sue to block Meta from acquiring Within. <https://www.msn.com/en-us/money/other/ftc-staff-reportedly-recommended-against-suing-meta/ar-AA106AfG> This is an example of the use of the greenlighting process to correct misalignment of agency head and staff priorities. See text at note 109, *infra*. [↑](#footnote-ref-32)
33. See Christopher S. Yoo, Thomas Fetzer, Shan Jiang, & Yong Huang, *Due Process in Antitrust Enforcement: Normative and Comparative Perspectives,* 94 So. Calif. L. Rev. 843, 912-14 (2021); Frazier, *supra* note 8 (calling for additional public participation in FTC settlement decisions). [↑](#footnote-ref-33)
34. <https://www.ftc.gov/reports/annual-highlights-2020/stats-data-2020>. At the time this article was written, the FTC had not released its 2021 annual report. [↑](#footnote-ref-34)
35. FCC Enforcement Overview 4-10 (2020) (hereinafter Enforcement Overview). [↑](#footnote-ref-35)
36. FCC 1; Enforcement Overview 19 [↑](#footnote-ref-36)
37. FCC 4. [↑](#footnote-ref-37)
38. FCC 4. [↑](#footnote-ref-38)
39. This practice is further discussed in Part V.B. [↑](#footnote-ref-39)
40. Details of the Commission’s consideration of forfeiture cases are provided in 47 U.S.C. §503(b)(3) and (4); Enforcement Overview 14-18. [↑](#footnote-ref-40)
41. Enforcement Overview 21. [↑](#footnote-ref-41)
42. FCC 1, 4. [↑](#footnote-ref-42)
43. FCC 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-43)
44. For a summary of FERC’s enforcement process, see Total Gas & Power North America v. FERC, 850 F.3d 325 (5th Cir. 2017); Todd Mullins & Chris McEachran, *Adjudication of FERC Enforcement Cases: “See You in Court?”* 36 Energy L. J. 261 (1015); Allison Murphy, Todd Hettenbach, & Thomas Olson, *The FERC Enforcement Process,* 35 Energy L. J. 283, 291-97 (2014) (hereinafter Murphy); *Revised Policy Statement on Enforcement,* 123 FERC ¶61156, ¶¶20-40 (2008) (hereinafter *Policy Statement*). [↑](#footnote-ref-44)
45. FERC 5, 6. https://www.ferc.gov/media/fiscal-year-2021-annual-report-enforcement [↑](#footnote-ref-45)
46. FERC 3, 6. [↑](#footnote-ref-46)
47. FERC 2, 3, 5. [↑](#footnote-ref-47)
48. The rule permitting targets to communicate with commissioners in writing dates back to 2008. Prior to that time, both oral and written communications were permitted. FERC 1, 2, 3, 5, 6. Murphy, *supra* note 44 at 292-93; *Policy Statement* ¶27. For further discussion of this practice, see Part V.B. [↑](#footnote-ref-48)
49. Generally, the decision whether to use compulsory process is up to the chair. FERC 6. [↑](#footnote-ref-49)
50. FERC 5 [↑](#footnote-ref-50)
51. Murphy, note 44 at 294; *Policy Statement* ¶32. [↑](#footnote-ref-51)
52. FERC 4, 5. [↑](#footnote-ref-52)
53. Murphy, note 44 at 294-5; *Policy Statement* ¶35. [↑](#footnote-ref-53)
54. FERC 3, 4, 5, 6. Cases involving regulated utilities nearly always settle. Cases involving energy market manipulation are less likely to settle. FERC 5. [↑](#footnote-ref-54)
55. FERC 5 thought the settlement authorization process was a significant check on prosecutorial discretion. FERC 4 and 6 thought it was useful for staff to get an early read from commissioners about the merits of the case. But FERC 5 and 6 thought it was of little utility and contributed to delay in resolving cases. [↑](#footnote-ref-55)
56. “Such notice shall provide sufficient information and facts to enable the entity to provide a response.”18 C.F.R. §1b.19. [↑](#footnote-ref-56)
57. See Part II. A. FERC staff is supposed to disclose exculpatory material that falls under the criminal-law *Brady* standard, but some defense lawyers argue that it does not do so. See FERC 2, 5. *See* William S. Scherman, Brandon C. Johnson, & James J. Fletcher, *The FERC Enforcement Process: Time for Structural Due Process and Substantive Reforms,* 35 Energy L. J. 101, 111-13 (2014) (hereinafter Scherman). [↑](#footnote-ref-57)
58. Scherman 111-13. [↑](#footnote-ref-58)
59. FERC 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-59)
60. FERC 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-60)
61. FERC 1, 2, 3, 6. [↑](#footnote-ref-61)
62. See Murphy et al., *supra* note 44 at 296. Murphy describes the *Barclay’s* case in which the target used all three opportunities to oppose the charging decision and submitted a total of 850 pages of argument & factual representations. [↑](#footnote-ref-62)
63. *Policy Statement* 36. For further discussion of separation of functions and ex parte communications, see Part V. C. [↑](#footnote-ref-63)
64. See Mullins & McEachran, *supra* note 44. See also *Total Gas & Power,* *supra* note 44. [↑](#footnote-ref-64)
65. FERC 2, 4, 5. [↑](#footnote-ref-65)
66. FERC 4. [↑](#footnote-ref-66)
67. Taft Hartley Act of 1947, §3(d), 29 U.S.C. §153(d). Whether the NLRB model should be carried to other agencies is discussed in part V. F. [↑](#footnote-ref-67)
68. President Biden fired General Counsel Peter Robb who had refused to resign. Various parties before the Board have challenged the legality of cases brought by the Acting General Counsel. So far, these challenges have failed. See Exela Enterprise Solutions v. NLRB, 32 F.4th 436 (5th Cir. 2022). The Board has also rejected challenges to Robb’s dismissal. Aakosh, Inc. 371 NLRB No. 46 (2021). [↑](#footnote-ref-68)
69. 29 U.S.C. §160(j). [↑](#footnote-ref-69)
70. NLRB 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-70)
71. NLRB 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-71)
72. NLRB 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-72)
73. NLRB 1, 2, 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-73)
74. NLRB 3. The statistics in this paragraph are derived from the NLRB’s 2021 Performance and Accountability Review and its Case Activity reports. All are located on the NLRB’s website, NLRB.gov. [↑](#footnote-ref-74)
75. In FY 2016, for example, the NLRB received 21,326 charges. Regional Offices issued 1272 complaints. The Board decided 296 contested ULP cases. The Board approved 29 requests to seek 10(j) temporary injunctions. The much lower number of 10(j) requests in 2021 reflected the policy preferences of the General Counsel. NLRB 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-75)
76. NLRB 1, 2, 3. Most settlements are informal; the charging party withdraws the charge after the charged party offers acceptable resolution. [↑](#footnote-ref-76)
77. NLRB 2. In 2021 NLRB ALJs issued 112 ULP decisions and settled 444 ULP cases. [↑](#footnote-ref-77)
78. For discussion of the division of power between investigators and agency prosecutors, see Van Loo, *supra* note 8. [↑](#footnote-ref-78)
79. There is a vast literature on the subject of accountability in administrative law and public administration. See The Oxford Handbook of Public Accountability (Mark Bovens, Robert E. Goodin & Thomas Schillemans eds., 2014); Elizabeth Fisher & Sidney A. Shapiro, Administrative Competence: Reimagining Administrative Law, ch. 3 (2020); Richman, *supra* note 5; Michael Asimow et al., *Ex Ante Administrative Review of the Legality of Regulations: A Comparative Approach*, 68 Amer. J. of Comp. L. 332 (2020); Edward Rubin, *The Myth of Accountability and the Anti-Administrative Impulse,* 103 Mich. L. Rev. 2073, 2120-2134 (2005). [↑](#footnote-ref-79)
80. Sohoni, *supra* note 8 at 42-47; Lemos, *supra* note 8 at 968-79 (discussing absence of executive and legislative accountability mechanisms for constraining enforcement). [↑](#footnote-ref-80)
81. FTC v. Standard Oil Co. of California, 449 U.S. 232 (1980) (holding FTC’s “reason to believe” greenlighting determination is not a final order and thus unreviewable). [↑](#footnote-ref-81)
82. 5 U.S.C. §701(a)(2); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985); In re National Nurses United, 47 F.4th 746, 757 (D.C. Cir. 2022) (how and whether OSHA enforces a regulation is committed to agency discretion); Public Citizen v. FERC, 7 F.4th 1177, 1195-96 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (FERC decision to terminate market-manipulation investigation is not judicially reviewable even though its substantive decision in the same case was held to be arbitrary); Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington v. Federal Election Commission, 993 F.3d 880 (D.C. Cir. 2021) (court cannot review FEC’s deadlocked decision not to prosecute even though primarily based on a question of law since it was also based on prosecutorial discretion); Lemos, *supra* note 8 at 990-992. [↑](#footnote-ref-82)
83. In addition to the costs and delays inherent in the judicial review process, regulated parties often fear that seeking judicial review of an enforcement decision could trigger reprisals from agencies with which they must maintain a good relationship. Asimow, *supra* note 79 at 359. [↑](#footnote-ref-83)
84. The executive branch could, of course, influence or overturn an agency’s prosecutorial guidelines (see text at notes 207-12, *infra* for discussion of guidelines) or impose its own enforcement priorities, at least on executive branch agencies. It could also seek to dictate enforcement priorities by manipulating the agency’s budget and through the process of appointing agency heads or high-level staff. See, e.g., Zachary S. Price, *Politics of Nonenforcement,* 65 Case Western L. Rev. 1119 (2015). However, executive involvement with individual enforcement decisions is rare. Andrias, *supra* note 8; Memorandum from White
House Counsel Dana Remus, July 21, 2021, <https://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/07/White-House-Policy-for-Contacts-with-Agencies-and-Departments.pdf?emci=12770deb-dfef-eb11-a7ad-501ac57b8fa7&emdi=eea5f50a-86f0-eb11-b563-501ac57b8fa7&ceid=203637>. Congress could also influence or overturn an agency’s prosecutorial guidelines, but Congressional interference in a pending adjudication is improper and could be a due process violation. Pillsbury Co. v. FTC, 345 F.2d 952 (5th Cir. 1980). [↑](#footnote-ref-84)
85. 5 U.S.C. §552b(c)(10). [↑](#footnote-ref-85)
86. 5 U.S.C. §552(b)(5); NLRB v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 421 U.S. 132 (1975). One former agency member told me that the chair concealed critical information about the charging process even from that member. FCC 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-86)
87. See Barkow, *supra* note 8 at 1131-38. [↑](#footnote-ref-87)
88. There is a rich literature on internal administrative law, but none of it concentrates on the problem of checking enforcement discretion. *See* Jennifer Nou, *Intra-Agency Coordination,* 129 Harv. L. Rev. 421 (2015); Gillian E. Metzger & Kevin M. Stack, *Internal Administrative Law,* 115 Mich. L. Rev. 1239 (2017); Elizabeth Magill, *Agency Self-Regulation,* 77 Geo Wash L. Rev. 859, 884-88 (2009); Sidney A. Shapiro & Ronald F. Wright, *The Future of the Administrative Presidency: Turning Administrative Law Inside Out,* 65 U. of Miami L. Rev. 577 (2011). [↑](#footnote-ref-88)
89. The necessity of agency head approval of charging decisions was recognized as far back as 1941 *Report of the Attorney General’s Committee on Administrative Procedure* which formed the rationale for enactment of the APA in 1946. See Daniel J. Gifford, *Adjudication in Independent Tribunals: The Role of an Alternative Agency Structure*, 66 Notre Dame L. Rev. 965, 978 (1991). [↑](#footnote-ref-89)
90. Of course, if the caseload does not permit agency heads to practice greenlighting, Congress or the agency should devise other accountability mechanisms. Gifford, *supra* note 89 at 992-1000. *See* Part V. H. [↑](#footnote-ref-90)
91. See Part I. [↑](#footnote-ref-91)
92. For discussion of the centrality of resource allocation and priority-setting, see Eric Biber, *The Importance of Resource Allocation in Administrative Law,* 60 Admin. L. Rev. 1, 16-24 (2008); Bornstein, *supra* note 8 at 859-62 (discussing diminishing budgetary resources for enforcement). [↑](#footnote-ref-92)
93. Legal scholars often urge that public administration principles be incorporated in administrative law. The primary concern of public administration theory is to make government institutions work competently and efficiently. In contrast, the primary concern of administrative law theory is to impose constraints upon administrative functions that favor regulated parties. *See* Fisher & Shapiro, *supra* note 79, ch. 1; Harlow & Rawlings, *supra* note 3 (distinguishing redlight and greenlight theories). [↑](#footnote-ref-93)
94. Indeed, Professor Metzger has argued that agency heads are constitutionally obligated to supervise the staff. Gillian E. Metzger, *The Constitutional Duty to Supervise,* 124 Yale L. J. 1836, 1890-99 (2015). [↑](#footnote-ref-94)
95. See Part I and Part II A. [↑](#footnote-ref-95)
96. William H. Simon, “The Organization of Prosecutorial Discretion,” in Langer & Sklansky, *supra* note 5; William H. Simon, *The Organizational Premises of Administrative Law,* 78 Law & Contemp. Prob. 61 (2015); Charles F. Sabel & William H. Simon, *The Duty of Responsible Administration and the Problem of Police Accountability,* 33 Yale J. on Reg. 165 (2016). . [↑](#footnote-ref-96)
97. See Paul R. Verkuil, *The Purposes and Limits of Independent Agencies,* 1988 Duke L.J. 257, 259-63 (1988); FTC 3. Some scholarship deprecates the value of deliberation in multi-member agencies, especially in the present hyper-polarized political environment. Ganesh Sitaraman & Ariel Dobkin, *The Choice Between Single Director Agencies and Multimember Commissions*, 71 Admin. L. Rev. 719, 738-55 (2019). [↑](#footnote-ref-97)
98. Jon D. Michaels, *Of Constitutional Custodians and Regulatory Rivals: An Account of the Old and New Separation of Powers,* 91 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 227 (2016). [↑](#footnote-ref-98)
99. See discussion of the sentinel effect in Part III. B. 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-99)
100. See Part III. B. 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-100)
101. SEC 5, 6, 7; FERC 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-101)
102. See Sohoni, *supra* note 8 at 55-63. [↑](#footnote-ref-102)
103. Lemos, *supra* note 8 at 952-56; Sohoni, *supra* note 8 at 67-69. [↑](#footnote-ref-103)
104. SEC 6; FTC 5. [↑](#footnote-ref-104)
105. NLRB 3; Parts II. E, and V. F. *See* Michael Ellement, *Labor Law in 3(d): Reexamining the General Counsel of the NLRB as an Independent Prosecutor of Labor Violations, 29* A.B.A. J of Labor and Empl. L. 477 (2014). [↑](#footnote-ref-105)
106. https://www.msn.com/en-us/money/other/ftc-staff-reportedly-recommended-against-suing-meta/ar-AA106AfG [↑](#footnote-ref-106)
107. All 8 of the SEC interviewees answered affirmatively, as did FERC 5, FCC 2, 4, and FTC 5. See Bardach & Kagan, *supra* note 8 at 34. [↑](#footnote-ref-107)
108. Barkow, *supra* note 8 at 1139; Christopher J. Walker, *Administrative Law Without Courts*, 65 UCLA L. Rev. 1620, 1628 (2018). Indeed, excessive checks and balances may lead to under-enforcement since front-line investigators and prosecutors are sometimes discouraged by the many hoops they must jump through. Bardach & Kagan, *supra* note 8 at 39-44. [↑](#footnote-ref-108)
109. SEC 8 [↑](#footnote-ref-109)
110. See, *e.g.*, Andrew N. Vollmer, *Accusers as Adjudicators in Agency Enforcement Proceedings*, 52 U. Mich. J. L. Ref. 103 (2018); Edward H. Fleischmann, *Toward Neutral Principles: The SEC’s Discharge of its Tri-Functional Administrative Responsibilities,* 42 Cath. U. L. Rev. 251 (1993); Miles Kirkpatrick et al., *Report of the ABA Antitrust Section,* 58 Antitrust L. J. 43, 119 (1989); *Report of the Task Force on the SEC Administrative Law Judge Process,* 47 Bus. Lwyr. 1731, 1732 (1992) Daniel R. Walfish, *The Real Problem with SEC Administrative Proceedings, and How to Fix It*, Forbes, July 20, 2015. [↑](#footnote-ref-110)
111. Another type of bias that might be called “institutional bias” exists independently of the confirmation bias that might be induced by greenlighting. Institutional bias means that agency heads are likely to believe in strong enforcement of the regulatory statute for which they are responsible. They probably wish to support the hard work of their prosecutorial and investigative staff by validating those lower-level decisions. Institutional bias is inevitably present in combined-function agency enforcement proceedings, but confirmation bias adds an additional concerning element. [↑](#footnote-ref-111)
112. See Part V. D. [↑](#footnote-ref-112)
113. Elman, *supra* note 24 at 810-12; Richard A. Posner, *The Federal Trade Commission*, 37 U. Chi. L. Rev. 47, 53 (1969). Posner and Elman offer no empirical support for these assertions which were tossed off briefly in long articles criticizing the FTC for other reasons. [↑](#footnote-ref-113)
114. SEC 8 [↑](#footnote-ref-114)
115. FERC 2; Scherman, *supra* note 57; Mullins & McEachran, *supra* note 44. [↑](#footnote-ref-115)
116. Grolier, Inc. v. FTC, 615 F.2d 1219-21 (9th Cir. 1980). [↑](#footnote-ref-116)
117. See Part IV. B. [↑](#footnote-ref-117)
118. SEC 1, 6. FTC 5. NLRB 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-118)
119. FTC 5. [↑](#footnote-ref-119)
120. SEC 4. FTC 3, 4. FCC 1, 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-120)
121. SEC 2, 6. [↑](#footnote-ref-121)
122. SEC 3. FTC 2. FCC 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-122)
123. SEC 5, 7, 8. FTC 1. FCC 4. [↑](#footnote-ref-123)
124. Maureen K. Ohlhausen, *Administrative Litigation at the FTC: Effective Tool for Developing the Law or Rubber Stamp,* 12 J. Competit. Law & Econ. 623 (2016). Overall, the FTC agency heads dismissed 40% of the competition cases that reached them for final decision, but dismissed only 9% of the consumer protection cases, suggesting that the final decision stage is not a rubber stamp process in competition cases. In an additional 13% of cases in which it imposed liability, the Commission struck some of the allegations, counts, or respondents, suggesting that it engaged in careful analysis. [↑](#footnote-ref-124)
125. Ohlhausen, *supra* note 124, cautions that this conclusion is only suggestive, as many other factors are in play, such as changes in antitrust doctrine and the rigor of recent FTC decisions at the time of her survey as compared to the past. In more recent years, there have been many fewer cases decided by the FTC agency heads, case selection has been more rigorous, the percentage of complaint dismissals is much lower, and the rate of affirmance by the federal courts is higher. [↑](#footnote-ref-125)
126. Nicole Durkin, *Rates of Dismissal in FTC Competition Cases from 1950-2011 and Integration of Decision Functions,* 81 Geo. Wash. L Rev. 1684 (2013). Durkin’s study concerned only competition cases, not consumer-protection cases and counted only “merits” dismissals, excluding non-merits decisions. The dismissal rate was 21% in the 1950s, 14% in the 1960s, 18% in the 1970s, 38% in the 1980s, 18% in the 1990s, and 0% in 2000-2011. The majority of the dismissals were “straddle” cases meaning they were brought under a president from one party but decided under a president from the opposing party. [↑](#footnote-ref-126)
127. See A. Douglas Melamed, Comments Submitted to the Federal Trade Commission, Workshop Concerning Section 5 of the FTC Act (Oct. 14. 2008, pp. 14-17 (questioning impartiality of the FTC heads based on high percentage of agency wins); Joshua Wright, *Supreme Court Should Tell FTC to Listen to Economists, Not Competitors on Antitrust,* Forbes March 14, 2016. Wright states that “the FTC has ruled for itself in 100% of its cases over the past three decades,” a claim refuted by Ohlhausen. Pp 10-13. [↑](#footnote-ref-127)
128. See *supra* note 111, discussing the difference between institutional and confirmation bias. [↑](#footnote-ref-128)
129. SEC 1, 3, 4, 6, 8. [↑](#footnote-ref-129)
130. SEC 1,2, 3, 4, 6, 8. [↑](#footnote-ref-130)
131. FERC 5. [↑](#footnote-ref-131)
132. FTC 5. [↑](#footnote-ref-132)
133. SEC 1. FTC 3, 5. [↑](#footnote-ref-133)
134. Vollmer, *supra* note 110. [↑](#footnote-ref-134)
135. 421 U.S. 35 (1975). See Michael Asimow, *Withrow v. Larkin,* in Leading Cases in Administrative Law, Matthew Wiener, Jeremy Graboyes, and Anna Shavers, eds. (forthcoming, 2023). [↑](#footnote-ref-135)
136. 421 U.S. at 57. [↑](#footnote-ref-136)
137. Cement Institute v. FTC, 333 U.S. 683 (1948); Hortonville Joint School Dist. v. Hortonville Educational Ass’n, 426 U.S. 482 (1976). In *Cement Institute*, the Court said: “If the Commission's opinions expressed in congressionally required reports would bar its members from acting in unfair trade proceedings, it would appear that opinions expressed in the first basing point unfair trade proceeding would similarly disqualify them from ever passing on another.” [↑](#footnote-ref-137)
138. *See, e.g.*, Simpson v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 29 F.3d 1418, 1424-25 (9th Cir. 1994) (rejecting claim of due process violation because agency head both approved prosecution and then decided the case after an ALJ decision); Marine Shale Processors v. EPA, 81 F.3d 1371, 1385 (5th Cir. 1996) (EPA regional administrator denied permit application, then adjudicated the same issue); Blinder, Robinson & Co. v. SEC, 837 F.2d 1099, 1107 (D. C. Cir. 1988) (SEC not prohibited from adjudicating case because it earlier prosecuted a criminal case against same party). A good example of the prevailing law on whether agency heads should be disqualified because of playing multiple roles is Zen Magnets, LLC v. Consumer Prod. Safety Comm’n, 968 F.3d 1156 (10th Cir. 2020). *Zen Magnets* held that due process is not violated when agency heads adopt a product safety regulation about the dangers of small magnets and then adjudicate the same issue. The agency heads made various statements at the time of the rulemaking about the dangers of the product, but the court considered they were “in role” (meaning they were performing agency functions as opposed to some non-agency function) and the statements did not indicate they had prejudged the issue. [↑](#footnote-ref-138)
139. 136 S. Ct. 1899 (2016). [↑](#footnote-ref-139)
140. See Model Code of Judicial conduct §2.11: “A judge shall disqualify himself or herself in any proceeding in which the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned, including… (6) The judge:
  (a) served as a lawyer in the matter in controversy, or was associated with a lawyer who participated substantially as a lawyer in the matter during such association;
  (b) served in governmental employment, and in such capacity participated personally and substantially as a lawyer or public official concerning the proceeding…”

 [↑](#footnote-ref-140)
141. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 410 (1971) which upheld the Social Security practice whereby an administrative law judge is responsible for developing the facts in a disability the case and then decides the case. “Neither are we persuaded by the advocate-judge-multiple-hat suggestion. It assumes too much and would bring down too many procedures designed, and working well, for a governmental structure of great and growing complexity.” [↑](#footnote-ref-141)
142. See Section IV. B. [↑](#footnote-ref-142)
143. See Section V. E. [↑](#footnote-ref-143)
144. See Michael Asimow, *When the Curtain Falls: Separation of Functions in the Federal Administrative Agencies,* 81 Colum. L. Rev. 759 (1981). [↑](#footnote-ref-144)
145. According to the legislative history of the APA, “The exemption from 554(d) was created only for those positions in which involvement in all phases of a case is dictated ‘by the very nature of administrative agencies, where the same authority is responsible for both the investigation-prosecution and the hearing and decision of cases.’” H. R. Rep. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 27 (1946). *See* Grolier, Inc. v. FTC, 615 F.2d 1215, 1220 (9th Cir. 1980). [↑](#footnote-ref-145)
146. In Environmental Defense Fund v. EPA, 510 F.2d 1292, 1305 (D.C. Cir. 1975), Judge Leventhal wrote: [Congress] has accepted a pragmatic view that the need for effective control by the agency head over the commencement of proceedings requires an ability to conduct consultations in candor with an investigative section on the question whether a notice should be issued and a proceeding begun, and this notwithstanding any residual possibilities of unfairness.” Similarly, *see* Air Products & Chemicals, Inc. v. FERC, 650 F.2d 687, 709-10 (5th Cir. 1981) (APA agency head exception allows prosecutorial staff to meet with agency heads in deciding to issue complaint). [↑](#footnote-ref-146)
147. *Withrow, supra* at 56: “It is also very typical for the members of administrative agencies to receive the results of investigations, to approve the filing of charges or formal complaints instituting enforcement proceedings, and then to participate in the ensuing hearings. This mode of procedure does not violate the Administrative Procedure Act, and it does not violate due process of law.” The APA does not, however, allow an attorney-adviser to the agency head to later serve as a ALJ in the same case in which the adviser materially participated in a greenlighting decision. Grolier Inc. v. Federal Trade Commission, 615 F.2d 1215, 1220 (9th Cir. 1980). Probably it does not allow agency heads to be advised ex parte by adversarial staff members when the heads are considering the final adjudicatory decision. See Asimow, *supra* note 144 at 766. [↑](#footnote-ref-147)
148. See Part V. H. [↑](#footnote-ref-148)
149. See Parts II. A, B, D, E. Similarly, the Consumer Product Safety Commission staff issues a “Notice and Opportunity to Respond and Advise” (NORA) to targets before recommending that a violation be charged. <https://www.consumerfinance.gov/enforcement/life-cycle-of-enforcement-action/> [↑](#footnote-ref-149)
150. SEC 5 [↑](#footnote-ref-150)
151. See Part II. A. [↑](#footnote-ref-151)
152. SEC 1, 5 [↑](#footnote-ref-152)
153. SEC 5 [↑](#footnote-ref-153)
154. SEC 1 to 8. [↑](#footnote-ref-154)
155. FERC 1 to 6 all thought the preliminary findings memo and response procedure were quite useful procedures. [↑](#footnote-ref-155)
156. FERC 2, 4, 5, 6. One interviewee thought the procedure was useful because of the long delays that occur in FERC enforcement; by the time the Rule 1b.19 memo issues, the composition of the agency heads has often changed and private lawyers have an opportunity to influence the new commissioners. FERC 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-156)
157. See *supra* note 98. [↑](#footnote-ref-157)
158. 5 U.S.C. §557(d)(1)(E). [↑](#footnote-ref-158)
159. FCC 4. [↑](#footnote-ref-159)
160. FTC 1 to 5. [↑](#footnote-ref-160)
161. FTC 5. [↑](#footnote-ref-161)
162. FTC 5. [↑](#footnote-ref-162)
163. FTC 1, 3, 5. [↑](#footnote-ref-163)
164. FTC 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-164)
165. FCC 2, 4. [↑](#footnote-ref-165)
166. SEC 1 to 8. FERC 5, 6. [↑](#footnote-ref-166)
167. FCC 4 thought each meeting took about an hour. [↑](#footnote-ref-167)
168. FTC 2; see Elman, *supra* note 24 at 788-89. [↑](#footnote-ref-168)
169. FERC 3, 4. [↑](#footnote-ref-169)
170. FERC 5. [↑](#footnote-ref-170)
171. Scherman, *supra* note 57 at 114-15 (2014). [↑](#footnote-ref-171)
172. 18 C.F.R. §§2201, 2202. See Asimow, *supra* note 144 for discussion of separation of functions. The APA rule prohibiting ex parte communications by outsiders to agency adjudicators goes into effect when the proceeding is noticed for hearing, but it can come into force earlier if the agency so designates. 5 U.S.C. §557(d)(1)(E). The separation of functions rule prohibits adversaries from participating or advising in any ALJ decision or agency review, but staff adversaries can communicate with agency heads off the record in connection with the greenlighting decision. 5 U.S.C. §554(d). *See* Part IV. B. [↑](#footnote-ref-172)
173. As discussed in Part V. B, FERC permits targets to communicate with the agency heads in writing before they have greenlighted the case. [↑](#footnote-ref-173)
174. 174 Murphy et al., *supra* note 44 at 299-302 (2014); Mullins & McEachran, *supra* note 44 at 285-86. [↑](#footnote-ref-174)
175. SEC 1 to 7; FERC 1, 3, 5, 6. FTC 1 to 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-175)
176. 5 USC §552b(c)(10). [↑](#footnote-ref-176)
177. See Auerbach, *supra* note 26 at 418-24. This was the practice in the NLRB before the 1947 legislation stripping agency heads of power over the charging process. Board members spent one morning per week considering questions relating to issuance of complaints in non-routine cases. Seymour Scher, *The Politics of Agency Organization,* 15 Western Pol. Q. 328, 331 (1962) [↑](#footnote-ref-177)
178. FERC 6. [↑](#footnote-ref-178)
179. NLRB 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-179)
180. This appears to be the case with the FTC. See Part II. B. The SEC has power to delegate any function to the staff, but a single commissioner can bring any delegated matter to the Commission for review. 15 U.S.C. §78d-1(a), (b). One former SEC staff member thought a delegation system could work but suggested that the staff should obtain approval from a duty commissioner in routine cases rather than from the full Commission. SEC 5. [↑](#footnote-ref-180)
181. SEC 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8. [↑](#footnote-ref-181)
182. FERC 5. [↑](#footnote-ref-182)
183. SEC 3. FTC 4. [↑](#footnote-ref-183)
184. SEC 4. The sentinel effect is discussed in text preceding note 107. [↑](#footnote-ref-184)
185. *See* Vollmer, *supra* note 110. Vollmer also argued that due process is violated when a member votes on a case in which the member greenlighted prosecution. Part IV. A. [↑](#footnote-ref-185)
186. SEC 1, 2, 6, 7. FERC 5, 6. FTC 1 to 5. FCC 2. [↑](#footnote-ref-186)
187. SEC 1. [↑](#footnote-ref-187)
188. FTC 3, SEC 6. [↑](#footnote-ref-188)
189. SEC 6. FTC 4, 5. [↑](#footnote-ref-189)
190. See Part II. E. [↑](#footnote-ref-190)
191. Jonathan D. Rosenblum, *A New Look at the General Counsel’s Unreviewable Discretion Not to Issue a Complaint under the NLRA,* 86 Yale L.J. 2349 (1977); Scher, *supra* note 178 (discussing 1947 politics of Taft-Hartley Act adoption). [↑](#footnote-ref-191)
192. See Calvani, *supra* note 24 at 206-07; Verkuil, *supra* note 97 at 267; SEC Task Force, *supra* note 110 at 1737. [↑](#footnote-ref-192)
193. NLRB 2 and 3. These approvals are usually secured through notational voting, not at an in-person meeting. *See* text at *supra* notes 69-71. [↑](#footnote-ref-193)
194. Prior to the Taft Hartley Act, the Board reviewed regional director decisions to charge or not charge only in cases involving important or unique legal issues. One morning a week of the Board members’ time was spent in considering questions relating to the issuance of complaints. Scher, *supra* note 178 at 331. [↑](#footnote-ref-194)
195. NLRB 3. See Robert Iafolla, *Labor Board Goes to Federal Court: 10(j) Injunctions, Explained*, https://news.bloomberglaw.com/daily-labor-report/labor-board-goes-to-federal-court-10j-injunctions-explained [↑](#footnote-ref-195)
196. NLRB 2, 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-196)
197. NLRB 1, 2, 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-197)
198. See Ellement, *supra* note 105 at 492-93, citing the refusal by the GC to enforce union shop provisions in the 1950s. The Board members could only resort to public criticism of the GC’s decision not to charge these cases. [↑](#footnote-ref-198)
199. *See* Ellement, *id.* at 491, describing a set of cases in which the General Counsel in the 1950s believed that unfair labor practices should be prosecuted even if they have only minor effect on interstate commerce, while the Board members disagreed. [↑](#footnote-ref-199)
200. NLRB 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-200)
201. Ellement, *supra* note 105 at 493-96; NLRB 3 [↑](#footnote-ref-201)
202. NLRB 1, 3; Ellement, note 107 at 492-93 [↑](#footnote-ref-202)
203. FTC 1, 2, 3, 5. SEC 2, 5 to 8. SEC 1 was open to the idea, but only if agency heads could remove the GC without cause. [↑](#footnote-ref-203)
204. SEC 5, 6 [↑](#footnote-ref-204)
205. SEC 2, 5 [↑](#footnote-ref-205)
206. SEC 3 [↑](#footnote-ref-206)
207. Barkow, *supra* note 5, at 1154-59. Sohoni, *supra* note 8 at 82; Vorenberg, *supra* note 5 at 1562-65; Norman Abrams, *Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion*, 19 UCLA L . Rev. 1 (1971). Agencies are not required to provide pre-adoption notice and comment with respect to general statements of policy, of which enforcement guidelines would be a paradigmatic example. 5 U.S.C. §553(b)(A). Guidelines should be flexible and leave room for discretion at both staff and agency head levels to avoid being treated as legislative rules that can only be adopted or revised with prior notice and comment. [↑](#footnote-ref-207)
208. *See* Texas v. United States, 14 F.4th 332, 338-40 (5th Cir. 2021). This decision overturned a district court decision that had enjoined immigration enforcement guidelines adopted on the first day of the Biden administration. The court construed several federal statutes to allow the agency to exercise enforcement discretion and issue enforcement guidelines. [↑](#footnote-ref-208)
209. 5 U.S.C. §552(a)(1)(D). [↑](#footnote-ref-209)
210. FCC *Enforcement Manual,* 17-18. [↑](#footnote-ref-210)
211. Ellement, *supra* note 105 at 489-90; NLRB 3. [↑](#footnote-ref-211)
212. Revised Policy Statement on Enforcement, 123 FERC ¶61156. [↑](#footnote-ref-212)
213. See text at note 96, *supra*. [↑](#footnote-ref-213)
214. See Part V. F. [↑](#footnote-ref-214)
215. Similarly, the article does not consider proposals for enhanced executive branch oversight of enforcement decisions (like the OMB’s control over rulemaking) or increased Congressional supervision of the enforcement function. [↑](#footnote-ref-215)
216. See Mullins & McEachran, *supra* note 44. There are numerous examples of enforcement agencies that lack adjudicatory power, such as the EEOC in cases of non-governmental employment discrimination or the Wage and Hour Division of the Department of Labor. The Fifth Circuit recently decided that the SEC could not constitutionally conduct in-house civil penalty adjudication and must bring such cases in federal court. *Jarkesy v. SEC*, discussed in text at note 11, *supra*. [↑](#footnote-ref-216)
217. See Part II. D. [↑](#footnote-ref-217)
218. See Part II. C. [↑](#footnote-ref-218)
219. See Michael Asimow, *Five Models of Administrative Adjudication,* 63 Amer. J. Comp. L. 3 (2015). [↑](#footnote-ref-219)
220. *See* Gifford, *supra* note 89; Verkuil, *supra* note 97 at 268-69; Peter L. Strauss, *Rules, Adjudications, and Other Sources of Law in an Executive Department: Reflections on the Interior Department’s Administration of the Mining Law,* 74 Colum L. Rev. 1231, 1254-64 (1974). [↑](#footnote-ref-220)
221. *See* Asimow, *supra* note 4 at 146-48. [↑](#footnote-ref-221)
222. *See* https://www.dm.usda.gov/ojo/ [↑](#footnote-ref-222)
223. *See* Christopher J. Walker & Matthew Lee Wiener, Agency Appellate Systems (Dec. 14, 2020) (report to the Admin. Conf. of the U.S.), <https://www.acus.gov/report/final-report-agency-appellate-systems>; Admin. Conf. Report, Rec. 68-6, “Delegation of Final Decisional Authority Subject to Discretionary Review by the Agency;” Admin. Conf. Rec. 83-3, “Agency Structures for Review of Decisions of Presiding Officers under the Administrative Procedure Act.” [↑](#footnote-ref-223)
224. See Russell L. Weaver, *Appellate Review in Executive Departments and Agencies*,48 Admin. L. Rev. 251 (1996);Ronald A. Cass, *Allocation of Authority Within Bureaucracies: Empirical Evidence and Normative Analysis,* 66 Bos. U. L. Rev. 1, 12-13 (1986); Verkuil, *supra* note 97 at 268-69. [↑](#footnote-ref-224)